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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Depending on the time horizon and the flexibility, firms have different economic decision
variables: Structural (long-term) and operational (short-term) decision variables. Structural
decisions are usually a long-run commitment of the firms over a certain time horizon. They are
irreversible in the short-run and affect the market position of the firm. Contrary, operational
decisions (e.g. price, quantity, investment) are flexible, firms can easily adjust operational
decisions if a shift in the market structure occurs or competing firms change their variables.
A lot of economic models use a multi-stage structure to represent timing and flexibility of
decision variables. From least flexible (long-run) to most flexible (short-run), firms decide
sequentially about their variables. Even though this form gives some insights about the
strategic interaction, all decisions are one-time decisions. To analyze firm behavior over a
certain time interval, a different approach is necessary.
A differential game extends the strategic behavior of the firms to a longer time horizon and
firms can adjust their operational decisions at every instant of time.1 A differential game is
able to shape strategic interactions of the players as well as long-run impact of operational
decisions. Generally, the initial setting for a differential is given, but what if structural
decisions define endogenously the initial setting?
This dissertation examines the significance of structural decisions and market structure on
1 For the definition of a differential game see Dockner et al. (2000), chap. 2-3.
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operational decisions. How do structural and operational decisions affect each other and
what is the meaning for long-run profitability and long-run consumer surplus? The general
research questions for this dissertation are:
• Do firms’ structural decisions influence each other?
• What is the impact of market structure on operational decisions?
• What is the long-term consequence of market structure and operational decisions on
profits and consumer surplus?
Structural changes (endogenous or exogenous) in the following three chapters are vertical
integration, corporate social responsibility and market entry. Operational decisions refer to
quantities, prices and R&D investment.
Organization of this work
This dissertation consists of three chapters covering the impact of structural market changes
on operational decisions, especially innovation incentives. Additionally, they consider how
structural changes and operational decisions influence profitability in the long-run.
Chapter 2 addresses the interaction of an endogenous structural decision (vertical integration)
and operational decisions (quantity and process innovation). More precisely, two suppliers
and two retailers and can merge vertically in a supply chain. Therefore, the market con-
sists of one or two integrated supply chains or is not integrated at all. To the best of my
knowledge, Laussel and Van Long (2012) is the only economic model which examines verti-
cal integration in a dynamic framework. Although mergers are structural commitments and
affect firm profits in the short- and long-run, most economic models use multi-stage models
with sequential moves. To model long-run effects of vertical mergers in oligopolistic indus-
tries, here a differential game is used. The focus is on the efficiency and competitive effect
of a vertical merger. For this reason, the model uses a non-cooperative differential game
for three different vertical structures (no integration, partial integration, full integration).
In the absence of integration, the industry consists of two competing downstream and two
competing upstream firms. Partial integration refers to one whereas full integration refers to
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both supply chains. In all three scenarios R&D and production patterns in the corresponding
Markov perfect equilibria with linear feedback strategies are considered. The model sheds
light on investment incentives and profitability of a vertical merger. First, the investment
incentive depends on the vertical structure, degree of competition and spillover. Second,
vertical integration is always profitable for the integrating firms and can be profitable for
the competing downstream firm if spillovers are high and competition low. In addition, the
vertical structure also affects the intertemporal strategic effect, which does not occur in a
static setting. Depending on spillover and intensity of competition, the intertemporal strate-
gic effect is different for all three vertical structures.
The following chapter 3 is a joint work with Bjo¨rn Brand2 where two firms decide endoge-
nously about their market label. Future investments can either be conservative and have some
kind of advertising character or they can be socially responsible to attract new consumers.
A social label or social commitment (structural decision) also requires socially responsible
investment (operational decision). As a result, no, one or two socially responsible firms can
compete on the market. The sales of each firm depend on their pricing strategy and their
goodwill stock. In addition to R&D costs, socially responsible investment increases the pro-
duction costs as well but it is more sustainable in the long-run. We analyze the conditions
and incentives for socially responsible investment in the equilibrium. To determine the equi-
librium outcome and the optimal investment strategies, a linear quadratic differential game
is used to derive Markov perfect strategies. Depending on the relationship of additional
production costs and sustainability of socially responsible investment, two equilibria emerge.
Either both firms choose advertising or both invest in social projects. The equilibrium with
two socially responsible firms is Pareto superior if the investments attract new consumers
and do not move consumers from one firm to another. The consumers’ preferred market
structure in terms of social and non-social firms deviates from the firms’ point of view due
to competition effect of product quality.
Whereas in chapter 2 and chapter 3 the market can be endogenously asymmetric, the mar-
ket is asymmetric by assumption in chapter 4. The structural market shift results from an
2 Institute of Organization and Economics of Institutions, University of Graz, Graz, Austria.
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entry of an open source firm into a monopolistic market with one proprietary software in-
cumbent. Both software firms sell differentiated bundles of hardware and operating system
for pi > ci. The later the entry, the fewer users buy the open source bundle and contribute
to the quality of the open source software. To analyze the connection between market entry
and user contributions, a multi-mode differential game with a monopoly and a duopoly mode
is used. The entry time is exponentially distributed and determines the switching from the
monopoly mode into the duopoly mode. The Markovian strategies for prices and investment
are derived for both modes. The anticipation of an entry and expected competition forces the
proprietary software firm to decrease its monopoly price before the entry actually takes place.
If users can contribute to the quality of the open source product, the proprietary software
firm lowers its monopoly price further such that less users buy the open source product and
contribute afterwards. Open source firms have higher investment and lower pricing incentives
than proprietary firms and are able to maintain a higher quality level of their products.
Software used for this work
Mathematica 9 was used for all numerical calculations and the source code is available on
request.
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1.2 Methodology
To analyze the interaction of structural (long-term) decisions and operational (short-term)
decisions, in each chapter from 2 to 4 a differential game is used. A very general definition
by Dockner et al. (2000, p. 27) of a differential game is: ” A differential game is a dynamic
game, played in continuous time. Two distinguishing features of a differential game are:
(i) the modeller introduces a set of variables to characterize the state of the dynamical
system at any instant of time during the play of the game, and
(ii) the evolution over time of the state variables is described by a set of differential equa-
tions.
Feature (i) makes the dynamic game a state space game and feature (ii) makes the game a
differential game.” The state of the dynamical system is characterized by a state vector x(t).
The operational decisions by each player are defined by a control vector ui(t).
In chapter 2 to 4 two players compete with each other and decide about their structural and
operational variables. Within a differential game an operational variable is called control
variable. Each player maximizes his payoff stream for a given time interval [0,∞]. Both
players select Markovian strategies u(t) = φ(x(t), t) for their optimal control path. If all
opponents of player i use Markovian strategies, then player i faces a control problem3
max
ui
J iφ−i(u
i(•)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtF iφ−i(x(t), u
i(t), t) dt
subject to x˙(t) = f iφ−i(x(t), u
i(t), t),
x(0) = x0
ui(t) ∈ R+0 ,
(1.2.1)
where J i is the objective functional, F i the instantaneous payoff (here: profit), f i the dy-
namics and r > 0 the discount rate.
To determine the Markovian strategies, the dynamic programming approach and, there-
fore, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmann (HJB) equation is used. The necessary value function
3 For more details about differential games see Dockner et al. (2000), chap. 2-4.
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V i : X × [0, T ] 7→ R has to satisfy the following equation4
rV i(x, t)− V it (x, t) = max
ui
{F iφ−i(x, ui, t) + V ix(x, t)f iφ−i(x, u, t) | ui ∈ R+0 }, (1.2.2)
as well as the terminal condition
lim
t→∞
e−rtVi(x(t), t) ≤ 0 i = 1, 2. (1.2.3)
The differential game in chapter 4 is more complex because the system switches from a
monopoly mode into a duopoly. This game is a multi-mode differential games (see Dockner
et al. (2000), chap. 8).
The respective transversality conditions for chapter 2 to 4 are
lim
t→∞
e−rt Vi(Ki(t), Kj(t), t) ≤ 0, i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j and Ki, Kj ∈ R+0 (1.2.4)
lim
t→∞
e−rt Vi(Gi(t), Gj(t), t) ≤ 0, i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j and Gi, Gj ∈ R+0 (1.2.5)
lim
t→∞
e−rt Vi(A(t), N(t), K1(t), K2(t), t) ≤ 0, i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j and A,N,Ki, Kj ∈ R+0 .
(1.2.6)
where each value function is bounded from below.
Autonomous linear-quadratic games
All differential games in chapter 2 to 4 are autonomous and linear-quadratic which simplifies
the HJB equation (1.2.2) with respect to multiple aspects.
• If the time horizon is T = ∞ and the payoff function, the dynamics and the controls
do not explicitly depend on the time variable, the game is called autonomous. As a
result, it is reasonable to look at stationary Markovian strategies ui(t) = ϕi(x(t)). The
equilibrium strategies and the value function are time independent as well Vi(x(t)).
• Due to time independence, V it in equation (1.2.2) is equal to zero.
• If additionally the game is linear quadratic, the payoff function of each player is
quadratic in state and control variable. In addition, the dynamics are linear in the
4 For a precise definition see Dockner et al. (2000, p. 41).
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state and the control variable.
As a result, player i’s equilibrium strategy is linear in the state, i.e. for one state
ui = ϕi(x(t)) = aix+bi and the value function is quadratic, Vi(x(t)) = Aix
2 +Bix+Ci.
Due to these properties the differential games are tractable.5
5 See Jørgensen and Zaccour (2007) for more details about analytically tractable games.
Chapter 2
Vertical Integration
2.1 Introduction
If firms want to maximize their profits, they have different decision variables: Short-run and
very flexible variables like price, output or R&D investment and long-run or strategic deci-
sions like cooperations or mergers. Nevertheless, both kinds of decisions affect each other and
this interaction is the main topic of this paper. The strategic decision is a vertical integration,
more specific a vertical merger.1 In the literature, integrations are classified as horizontal
and vertical. Horizontal integrations occur between firms on the same market, whereas a
vertical integration includes two firms of a supply chain. The aim of this paper is to analyze
the impact of different vertical structures on quantity decisions and investment in process
innovation. Therefore, a infinite-horizon differential with capital accumulation is used for
three different vertical structures (no integration (NI), partial integration (PI), full integra-
tion (FI)). Initially, two downstream firms compete for quantities in a differentiated market
and they have to buy their homogeneous inputs from a upstream market. The upstream
markets consists of two suppliers, who decide on their quantities and investment in process
innovation. The inputs are homogeneous, and the R&D incentives are affected by knowledge
spillovers. A vertical integration of an upstream and downstream firm, labeled as partial
integration, increases the efficiency of the integrating firm and reduces the competition on
1 Vertical integration is used in terms of a vertical merger. For a definition of vertical integration and
specification see Perry (1988).
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the input market.2 An integration of the remaining supply chain reduces the model to a
Cournot duopoly with investment spillover, which is the full integration case. In contrast
to other vertical integration models, which are usually two stage games, the infinite-horizon
differential game framework contains long-run effects and is more adequate to model strategic
decision like an integration.
This paper focuses on vertical integration, but even vertical integration can be split in dif-
ferent aspects, which are already examined by the existing literature.
One class of papers covers competitive and foreclosure effects. Salop and Scheffman (1987)
identify vertical integration as a strategy for ”raising rivals’ costs” because downstream
competition is reduced and, therefore, can be anticompetitive. More general,Salinger (1988)
shows that vertical integration between retailers and suppliers, who compete on oligopolistic
markets, can lead to higher or lower final good prices because of two opposing effects of verti-
cal integration3. First, an integration lowers the competition of suppliers which increases the
wholesale price and of course the price for the final good. Second, the merged firm produces
more of the final good which lowers the price for consumers. The dominating effect depends
on the parameters. The anticompetitive effect in a asymmetric market with a dominant firm,
which can be partially integrated, and fringe firms, who want to enter the market, is inves-
tigated by Riordan (1998). A game-theoretic model by Ordover et al. (1990) uses bidding
stages to model integration incentives. The downstream firms can make offers and counter
offers to the upstream firms to determine the vertical structure (separation, partial- and full
integration). In contrast to the previous two papers partial integration and increased input
costs can be avoided endogenously by a counter offer of the remaining downstream firm.
In addition to the downstream market, vertical integration impacts also the upstream mar-
ket. Thus, Chen (2001) extends his analysis on competitive effects on both markets4 and
the results show that vertical integration affects firm’s behavior on both markets if multiple
suppliers are available: competitor’s choice of a supplier, independent upstream firm’s and
2 Due to the fact that both markets consist of the same number of firms, a possible ”foreclosure effect” of
a vertical integration is excluded.
3 The paper is referred to market foreclosure in the sense that an integrated firm can not participate to
the intermediate good market.
4 A general survey of competition effects of vertical integration can be found in Riordan (2008).
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integrated downstream firm’s pricing.
Abiru et al. (1998) find that the equilibrium structure (no integration, partial integration, full
integration) depends on the initial number of suppliers and downstream firms. If the number
is unequal, all three structures are possible.5Nevertheless, the mergers are still exogenous.
Vertical mergers are endogenous if offers must be accepted by each of the potentially inte-
grated firms (Atallah (2007)). Moreover, the offers are limited because they must be lower
than the increase in profits as a result of the integration. In exogenous models the amount
of the selling price of integrated firm is not taken into consideration. This context raises the
question if vertical integration is always preferable (Lambertini and Rossini (2008))6 or if
vertical separation and integration can coexist (Jansen (2003))7?
To the best of my knowledge just a few papers deal with innovations in vertically related
markets, especially process R&D in conjunction with vertical integrated markets. Banerjee
and Lin (2003) pick up the raised input prices and add additional R&D investment. If up-
stream suppliers are connected via a common supplier, investment in downstream process
R&D raises demand which leads to higher input prices. Accordingly, additional R&D invest-
ment can enforce the ”raising rivals’ costs” effect. Brocas (2003) examines the relation of
vertical market structure and cost-reducing investment and the effect of vertical integration
on innovation incentives. In contrast to this paper, she looks on licenses and switching cost
whereas the following model fixes supply chains and compares the effect of vertical integra-
tion decisions on production and R&D investment.
The following model is closely related to Buehler and Schmutzler (2008). Similar to Ordover
et al. (1990), they use a model with two upstream and two downstream firms. In addition
to the possible vertical structures (separation, partial- and full integration), firms can also
invest in process R&D. Their focus is on the relation between vertical market structure and
5 If the number of firms is equal, full integration emerges as equilibrium structure
6 Lambertini and Rossini (2008) use a supply chain model with one upstream and downstream firm and
ask ”if vertical desintegration is preferable to integration when there is process R&D ?”
7 Jansen (2003) is similar to Abiru et al. (1998), but he discusses forward integration with more down-
stream than upstream firms. The bigger amount of downstream firms results in bargaining power of the
upstream firm. If they don’t integrate they can offer ”make take-it-or-leave-it offers” to the downstream
firms.
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cost-reducing investment and they point out the ”intimidation effect”: Vertical integration
increases own investment and decreases competitor’s investment. Vertical integration is en-
dogenously and the downstream firm has to pay a fixed amount F > 0 for a supplier.
Similar to Buehler and Schmutzler (2008), the focal point is on investment incentives and
profitability of vertical integration, but the setup deviates in some aspects. First, a differ-
ential game is used instead of a static four stage game. In all three vertical structures the
innovating firms use feedback strategies and update their output and investment decisions
at every instant of time. As a result, an intertemporal effect exists, which is different in
all three vertical structures and does not occur in static games. Second, the final product
is differentiated and spillover occur between R&D sections. Third, no price F > 0 has to
be paid to integrate. An integration is profitable if the revenue of the integrating firm is
higher than the summarized revenue of the separated firms. On the other hand, the model is
limited to one configuration of market size and costs whereas Buehler and Schmutzler (2008)
show that in equilibrium all structures (separation, partial- and full integration) are possible
depending on market size and cost parameter.
The market structure of the supplier and the retailer market depends on the integration
decision. Initially, two differentiated downstream firms have to purchase their homogeneous
inputs from two innovative upstream firms, who can invest in process R&D to lower their
production costs. A vertical integration removes one upstream firm from the upstream mar-
ket and the R&D section is transferred to the downstream market. A knowledge flow always
exists between R&D sections due to knowledge spillover. The analysis of the differential game
for the three vertical structures (No Integration, Partial Integration, Full Integration) shows
an interaction of market structure and parameters. First, the investment incentive depends
on the vertical structure, degree of competition and spillover. If both markets are separated,
competition and spillover lower investment incentives. Vertical integration results in a rise of
investment for the integrated firm and a decline for the independent supply chain. With low
competition, spillovers encourage investment, whereas with high competition spillovers dis-
courage investment. The same effects occur with full integration, but the effects are stronger,
because the independent supply chain weakens both effects. Second, vertical integration is
always profitable for the integrating firms, because it eliminates double marginalization and
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increases the efficiency. It can be profitable for the remaining upstream firm if spillovers
are high and competition low, but the remaining downstream firm is always punished with a
weaker market power. A vertical integration of the remaining up- and downstream firms is al-
ways profitable for these firms and even profitable for the already integrated firm if spillovers
are high and competition low.
The work is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model. The Cournot feedback
equilibria are presented in section 2.3 and compared in section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Framework
Initially, the structure is as follows: An innovative industry with two supplier, called upstream
firms, produce a homogeneous good which is used by two retailers, called downstream firms.
The downstream firms transform the input one-to-one into the differentiated final good. In
addition, the upstream firms are able to invest in process innovation but have to take knowl-
edge spillovers on the upstream market into account. Due to the innovation potential the
upstream firms are possible targets for vertical mergers.8 Firms compete in outputs on both
markets.
Due to the structure, two vertical mergers are possible resulting in three different vertical
structures: No Integration, Partial Integration, Full Integration. No Integration is the initial
setting. If an upstream firm integrates with downstream firm, the upstream firm is removed
from the upstream market but still linked with the remaining supplier because of the knowl-
edge spillover. The merged firm controls now final output and R&D investment.9 The second
retailer is not foreclosed because the input can be bought from the remaining upstream firm
and both act non-cooperative in a supply chain. In consequence of the integration, the re-
maining upstream firm has not to compete with another upstream firm for the demand. As
a result, the independent supplier has higher market power and the independent retailer has
to pay higher wholesale prices. A second integration eliminates the last independent supply
chain and both downstream firms produce the input themselves. The model is now simplified
8 This idea should reflect mergers between innovative start-up companies and incumbent companies.
9 No distinction between forward and backward integration. For further details see Perry (1988).
Chapter 2. Vertical Integration 13
to a Cournot duopoly with differentiated products and process innovation with spillover. Fig-
ure 2.1 shows the three vertical structures. To show the strategic long-run effect of a vertical
(hom.) Upstream Market
Diff. Downstream Market
U2U1
D1 D2
R&D spillover β
s
(a) No Integration
Upstream Market 
Diff. Downstream Market
U2U1
D1 D2
R&D spillover β
F1
s
(b) Partial Integration
(no) Upstream Market
Diff. Downstream Market
U2U1
D1 D2
R&D spillover β
F1 F2
s
(c) Full Integration
Figure 2.1: Possible vertical structures
integrations, a differential game with knowledge accumulation, to model process innovation,
is used. As a result, the three structures are represented by an infinite-horizon differential
game with four, three or two players. The three vertical structures (No Integration, Partial
Integration, Full Integration) are compared to see the impact of an integration on R&D in-
vestment and profitability. Finally, the comparison concludes with the Nash-equilibrium for
the Bimatrix game.
Supply chain 2
separate integrate
Supply chain 1
separate No Integration Partial Integration
integrate Partial Integration Full Integration
Table 2.1: Two player Bimatrix Game
2.2.1 Consumers
Similar to Singh and Vives (1984), the utility function of the representative consumer is as
follows
U(q1, q2) = A(q1 + q2)− 1
2
(q21 + q
2
2)− sq1q2, A > 0,
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where qi is the output of firm i and 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. The degree of product differentiation is
represented by s. If s is equal to zero, the two goods are independent and homogeneous if s
is equal to one. Otherwise, they are substitutes depending on the degree of differentiation.
The utility function leads to the inverse demand
p1 = A− q1 − sq2
p2 = A− sq1 − q2.
(2.2.1)
2.2.2 Upstream Market
The structure of the upstream market depends on the the integration decision and can be
seen in Figure 2.1. Three cases are possible:
1) No Integration
The firms decide not to integrate and both markets are strictly separated. Two firms
compete a la Cournot on a differentiated downstream market whereas two upstream
firms compete in output and R&D investment in a homogeneous upstream market. The
output decisions of the downstream firms transfer one-to-one to the demand function
of the upstream market. For this reason , the demand for the upstream market can be
written as10
Qu = D(w) = Qd(w) = qd1(w) + q
d
2(w).
2) Partial integration
Without loss of generality, downstream firm 1 decides to integrate with upstream firm
1. The upstream market gets the structure of a monopoly because upstream firm 1 is
integrated, supplies downstream firm 1 and upstream firm 2 is left to supply downstream
firm 2. Therefore, no foreclosure effect occurs.
3) Full integration
Both downstream firms decide to integrate with one upstream firm. On the upstream
market is no competition, because each upstream firm supplies his downstream division.
10 Assuming it is irrelevant from which supplier each firm buys its input. The summarized demand of the
downstream market is produced by the upstream market and the market clearing condition holds.
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The production of the input good on the upstream market is costly and depends on the
following cost function
Ci(qi, Ki, Kj) = (ci −Ki − βKj)qi (2.2.2)
with ci < A, ci −Ki − βKj ≥ 0, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
Let Ki be the accumulated knowledge stock of R&D of firm i. The total production costs
of firm i depend on the produced quantity and on both R&D stocks. β is the knowledge
spillover between the upstream divisions.11 The spillover β is exogenously given and the
right-hand side of (2.2.2) is strictly positive.
Denote by Ii the R&D investment of firm i. The resulting investment cost Ri are quadratic
Ri(Ii) =
γ
2
(Ii)
2 γ > 0. (2.2.3)
The capital stock of firm i evolves over time according to the following standard accumulation
process
K˙i = Ii − δKi, Ki(0) = K0, (2.2.4)
where 0 ≤ δ < 1 is a constant depreciation rate.
If the upstream firms are not integrated, the demand for the input good depends on the
wholesale price w = D(Qu)−1 which depends on the demand of the downstream market. As
a consequence, the upstream firms solve the following maximization problem
max
qi,Ii
{
Πui =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt[w(qi + qj)qi − Ci(qi, Ki, Kj)−Ri(Ii)] dt
}
s.t. : K˙i = Ii − δKi, Ki(0) = K0.
(2.2.5)
with the discount rate 0 < r ≤ 1.
2.2.3 Downstream Market
If the downstream firms are not integrated, they have to purchase their input good from the
upstream market. Therefore, they pay w for each unit of input.12 The downstream firms are
price taker.
11 The knowledge spillover always exists, regardless whether the upstream firm is integrated or not.
12 Assume that the transformation costs are equal to zero and the transformation is one-to-one.
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If a downstream firm integrates with an upstream supplier, the integrated firm is able to
produce the input good itself and can transfer the input one-to-one to the downstream division
without additional cost.13 The R&D section has always (regardless whether the upstream
division is integrated or not) the possibility to invest in R&D to reduce the production costs.
An integration decision gives the integrated firm control about the output of the whole supply
chain and R&D investment. The maximization problem for the independent downstream firm
is as follows
max
qi
pidi = (pi − w)qi. (2.2.6)
The downstream firm faces a simple maximization problem, because the output decision
does not depend directly on any state dynamics. The output decision depends only on the
wholesale price w and the downstream firm is a price taker.14 The wholesale price varies over
time, because the upstream firm can invest in R&D to lower cost and as a consequence the
price.
If the downstream firm decides to integrate with an upstream supplier, the integrated firm
controls the price on the downstream market and the investment on the upstream market.15
In that case, the objective and state dynamic for the integrated firm are
max
qi,Ii
{
Πdi =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt[piqi − Ci(qi, Ki, Kj)−Ri(Ii)] dt
}
s.t. : K˙i = Ii − δKi, Ki(0) = K0.
(2.2.7)
where 0 < r ≤ 1 is the discount rate.
2.2.4 Linear quadratic game and Markov perfect equilibrium
Although the number of players is different in all three vertical scenarios, the differential game
in each setting has a similar structure. The innovating firms face an infinite-time horizon
linear quadratic game. It is assumed that firms use Markovian strategies and by using a
dynamic programming approach, the value functions of the players have to be determined.
13 Thus, Integration eliminates the effect of double marginalization.
14 The argumentation follows the industrial organization literature whereas in the marketing literature the
supplier is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower.
15 The input good is transfered for free (w = 0).
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Still, it is well known that the value functions of the players are linear quadratic and the
strategies are linear in the state. In addition to the linear quadratic structure, the game is
also autonomous, i.e. time does not occur in the instantaneous payoff and state dynamics. As
a consequence, the coefficients of the value functions are constant and stationary Markovian
feedback strategies exist.16 For that reason, the value functions for all three vertical structures
can be given by
V1 =
1
2
B1K
2
1 +
1
2
B2K
2
2 +B3K1K2 +B4K1 +B5K2 +B6
V2 =
1
2
D1K
2
1 +
1
2
D2K
2
2 +D3K1K2 +D4K1 +D5K2 +D6
(2.2.8)
where Vi is the value function of the innovating firm in the supply chain. Depending on the
vertical structure, this can be an independent upstream firm or an integrated firm. Each
players value function includes six coefficients. The system is nonlinear and its solution is
not unique. The solution, which satisfies the condition of global stability of the steady state,
is determined by numerical calculation. The resulting partial derivatives are
∂V1
∂K1
= B1K1 +B3K2 +B4
∂V1
∂K2
= B2K2 +B3K1 +B5
∂V2
∂K1
= D1K1 +D3K2 +D4
∂V2
∂K2
= D2K2 +D3K1 +D5.
(2.2.9)
If the innovating firms have chosen their optimal investment strategy, the system of state
dynamics can be rewritten in the following wayK˙1
K˙2
 =
B1−γδγ B3γ
D3
γ
D2−γδ
γ
K1
K2
+
B4
D5
 (2.2.10)
The following proposition characterizes the globally asymptotically stable Markov perfect
equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2.1 If the determinant of the matrix in equation (2.2.10) is unequal to zero
and the following condition holds:
B1 +D2 ±
√
(B1 −D2)2 + 4B3D3 < 2γδ, (2.2.11)
16 For more details about linear quadratic game and Markovian strategies see Dockner et al. (2000).
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then the equilibrium steady state (Kss1 , K
ss
2 ) is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof: The eigenvalues of the matrix in equation (2.2.10) are
λ1,2 =
B1 +D2 ±
√
(B1 −D1)2 + 4B3D3 − 2γδ
2γ
. (2.2.12)
If the eigenvalues are negative, the system is locally asymptotically stable. Due to the linear
quadratic structure, it is even globally asymptotically stable.
Following Dockner et al. (2000), the transversality condition for the given infinite time horizon
problem has to be satisfied
lim
t→∞
e−rtV (Ki(t), Kj(t), t) ≤ 0.
If V is bounded from below and the system globally asymptotically stable, the transversality
condition holds.
2.3 Cournot Feedback Equilibrium
2.3.1 No Integration
No integration takes place. The downstream firms are faced with Cournot competition with
differentiated products. The sum of the resulting Nash outputs determine the demand for the
upstream market and the upstream firms produce the homogeneous input for the downstream
industry. They maximize their optimization problems subject to the dynamics and the given
demand of the downstream industry.17 The competition on the upstream market is strong
because of the homogeneous inputs, but the producers can benefit from each other due to
the spillovers on their market. The spillover parameter β and differentiation degree s will
be varied to figure out the ”competition effect” in the downstream section and the ”spillover
effect” in the upstream section. In this setting both effects are separated on their respective
markets. In the two other vertical structures these effects will mix up, because integrated
firms act on both markets.
17 Assuming the downstream firm i buys his input from upstream firm i, the inputs are transfered on-to-one
to the downstream section.
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Downstream Market
The maximization problem of the downstream firms is a static problem because of the inde-
pendence of any state dynamic.
max
qi
Πdi = [A− qi − sqj − w]qi (2.3.1)
The first order condition and the reply function yield to the Cournot Nash equilibrium
qNi =
(2− s)(A− w)
4− s2 =
A− w
s+ 2
(2.3.2)
Upstream Market
The downstream demand for the input good is the sum of equilibrium outputs and therefore,
the inverse demand for the upstream market is
w = A− (s+ 2
2
)(q1 + q2). (2.3.3)
The upstream firms compete in Cournot competition and are faced to the following maxi-
mization problem
max
qi,Ii
∫ ∞
0
e−rt[(w − ci +Ki + βKj)qi − γ
2
(Ii)
2] dt
s.t. K˙i = Ii − δKi, Ki(0) = K0 = 0, Ii, qi, Ki ≥ 0, i = 1, 2
(2.3.4)
In this noncooperative Cournot feedback game, the firms select independently their output
qi and their R&D investments. To determine the feedback strategies, the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation for two state variables is used.
rVi(Ki, Kj) = max
qi,Ii
[(
A−
(
s+ 2
2
)
(qi + qj)− ci +Ki + βKj
)
qi
− γ
2
(Ii)
2 +
∂Vi(·)
∂Ki
(Ii − δKi) + ∂Vi(·)
∂Kj
(φj − δKj)
] (2.3.5)
Proposition 2.3.1 The firms’ Cournot feedback equilibrium output and R&D investment
strategies in the absence of integration are given by
qCi =
2(A− 2ci + cj + (2− β)Ki + (2β − 1)Kj)
3(s+ 2)
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j
IC1 =
1
γ
(B1K1 +B3K2 +B4)
IC2 =
1
γ
(D2K2 +D3K1 +D5)
(2.3.6)
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where the coefficients Bi and Di solve the system of equation given by the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation. The value functions are quadratic and symmetric according to (2.2.8).
Proof: See section A.1.
Results for No Integration
In the absence of integration, the competition effect created by s and the spillover effect
created by β can be separated strictly. First, higher knowledge spillovers decrease the steady
Figure 2.2: Steady state investment in the absence of integration
state investment incentives because higher spillover create a negative externality. This effect is
independent of the intensity of competition. The higher the spillover the lower the investment.
The spillover effect can be seen in the left picture of Figure 2.2. However, it does not mean
that high spillover result in lower knowledge stock, because the higher spillover compensates
the lower effort. Overall, on one hand spillover lower R&D activity, but raises knowledge
flow of the whole industry.
Second, stronger competition reduces reduces R&D investment. The stronger the competition
on the downstream market the lower is the input demand for the upstream industry, and
lower demand comes to lower incentives for the upstream firms to invest in process R&D.
The competition effect for different spillovers can be seen in right picture of Figure 2.2.
2.3.2 Partial Integration
Asymmetric integration describes the vertical structure of an integrated supply chain, one
downstream firm is integrated with one upstream firm, and an independent supply chain.18
18 W.l.o.g. assume downstream firm 1 is integrated with upstream firm 1.
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Due to the integration, upstream firm 2 is not competing on the upstream market and supplies
only downstream firm 2. No foreclosure occurs because of the presence of an independent
supply chain with one firm on each market. Similar to the first problem (No Integration)
the differentiation degree and spillover degree will be varied to see how both effects change
steady state investment in a modified vertical structure. The integrated firm, called F1,
is associated with the remaining independent firms in different ways. The output of the
downstream section depends on the intensity of competition, therefore s, which affects the
output of the independent downstream firm. The upstream section, or R&D section, is
affected by the knowledge spillover which has an effect on the investment incentives of the
independent upstream firm. In contrast to No Integration both effects are mixed because of
the supply chain of the independent firms. Thus, all sections of the market are connected
and the connection can be seen in the second picture of Figure (b).
Downstream Market
With Cournot competition on the downstream market, the integrated firm F1 produces the
input himself and the output of firm 2 is the demand for the remaining monopolist on the
upstream market. The independent downstream firm maximizes the following static problem
max
q2
Πd2 = (p2 − w2)q2, (2.3.7)
because of the absence of state dynamics and is price taker for the wholesale price w2. The
FOC yields to the best reply function
q2 =
A− sq1 − w2
2
. (2.3.8)
Due to vertical integration, F1 owns the upstream and downstream division and controls
both the production (q1) and the R&D investment (I1). Hence, the maximization problem
is as follows
max
q1,I1
∫ ∞
0
e−rt[A− q1 − sq2 − c1 +K1 + βK2)q1 − γ(I1)2] dt
s.t. K˙1 = I1 − δK1, K1(0) = K0.
(2.3.9)
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Similar to the No Integration case, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmann (HJB) equation is used to
determine the Cournot feedback strategy.19
rV1(K1, K2) = max
I1,q1
[
(A− q1 − sq2 − c1 +K1 + βK2)q1
− γ
2
(I1)
2 +
∂V1
∂K1
(I1 − δK1) + ∂V1
∂K2
(φ2 − δK2)
] (2.3.10)
Upstream Market
Equation (2.3.8) determines the demand for the upstream market depending on w2 and by
transformation the inverse demand for the independent upstream firm is
w2 = A− sq1 − 2q2. (2.3.11)
As a consequence, the monopolist on the upstream market has to solve
max
q2,I2
∫ ∞
0
e−rt[(A− sq1 − 2q2 − c2 +K2 + βK1)q2 − γ
2
(I2)
2] dt
s.t. K˙i = Ii − δKi, Ki(0) = K0, i = 1, 2 ,
(2.3.12)
which results in the HJB equation of the upstream monopolist
rV2(K1, K2) = max
I2,q2
[
(A− sq1 − 2q2 − c2 + βK1 +K2)q2
− γ
2
(I2)
2 +
∂V2
∂K2
(I2 − δK2) + ∂V2
∂K1
(φ1 − δK1)
]
.
(2.3.13)
The solution of both dynamic problems provides the feedback strategies for Partial Integra-
tion which is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3.2 The firms’ Cournot feedback equilibrium output and R&D investment
strategies for Partial Integration are given by
qc1 =
(4− s)A− 4c1 + sc2 + (4− sβ)K1 + (4β − s)K2
8− s2
qc2 =
(2− s)A− 2c2 + sc1 + (2β − s)K1 + (2− sβ)K2
8− s2
Ic1 =
1
γ
(B1K1 +B3K2 +B4)
Ic2 =
1
γ
(D2K2 +D3K1 +D5)
(2.3.14)
19 q2 is the output decision of the downstream firm and depends on the price w2. Thus, the maximization
problem of the integrated firm F1 is also related to the dynamic maximization problem of upstream firm
2.
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and where the coefficients Bi and Di solve the system of equation given by the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation and the value functions are quadratic according to equation (2.2.8).
Proof: See section A.2.
Results for Partial Integration
With an integrated firm, competition and spillover effect can not be separated anymore and
both effects depend on each other. First, the spillover effect depends on the intensity of com-
Figure 2.3: Steady state investment for Partial Integration
petition. With low competition, knowledge spillover encourage R&D investment but with
strong competition, knowledge discourages R&D activity. The reason for this contrary effects
can be explained by the interaction parameters and the vertical structure. If the competition
is weak, the R&D sections care less about the transfered knowledge to the rival because
the lowered cost does not harm them on the downstream market.20 If the competition is
strong, R&D incentives are reduced because investment harm the firms on the downstream
market. For example, the knowledge of the integrated firm is transferred to the independent
upstream firm and results in a lower wholesale price. The lower the wholesale price the better
the positioning of the independent upstream firm and this is all the worse if the competition
is strong.21 In the end, investment on the upstream market has a harming effect on the
downstream market. In summary, knowledge spillover encourage investment if competition
is low and discourage investment with strong competition.
Second, the competition effect looks different depending on firm and degree of spillover. For
the independent upstream firm, stronger competition lowers investment incentives. Due to
20 Just a size effect for s = 0 : β ↗⇒ ci ↘⇒ qi ↗⇒ incentives to invest ↗ .
21 This is effect is also the other way around, but without the wholesale price because F1 is integrated.
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the integration, F1 is more efficient and has a stronger market position because F1 can sell
their products directly to the consumers and do not have to pay a wholesale price. If the
competition intensity increases, the independent downstream firm reduces their demand and
therefore reduces investment incentives of the supplier. For the integrated firm the invest-
ment curve has a U-shaped form for low spillover and is decreasing for high spillover. An
explanation for the U-shape and the relation of competition, spillover and U-shaped invest-
ment incentives have been discussed by Kopel (2009) and Sacco and Schmutzler (2011). The
declining investment is a result of the high spillover. If the spillovers are high, R&D invest-
ment harms the firms on the downstream market the stronger the competition is. Finally,
both firms invest on different levels. Buehler and Schmutzler (2008) call this ”intimidation
effect”: If a vertical integration takes place the integrating firm increase investment whereas
the independent firm decreases investment. This effect will be discussed in section 2.4.1.
2.3.3 Full Integration
With Full integration both downstream firms are integrated with one upstream firm and
produce the input on their own. Two acquisitions of the upstream firms eliminate the com-
petition on the upstream market and reduces the model to a differentiated market with
knowledge spillover.22
Setting
In contrast to the No-Integration case, where both upstream upstream firms compete with
each other, and the Partial-Integration case, where one monopolist is on the upstream market,
no firm is left on the upstream market. Both R&D firms are fully integrated and each supply
chain is controlled by one player. Competition takes place only on the downstream market
and the maximization problem for both integrated firms can be described with a differential
game between two firms. As a result and in contrast to the previous cases, knowledge spillover
and competition intensity affect each other on the same market.
22 This setting is similar to the model in Breton et al. (2004), but differs in cost structure, spillover and
parameters.
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Each upstream firms is integrated with a supplier.23 Production and the R&D investment are
controlled by one player. The input good is produced on the upstream market and transfered
one-to-one to the downstream market, where the integrated firms compete with each other.
The maximization problem can be described as follows
max
qi,Ii
{
Πdi =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt[pi − ci +Ki + βKj]qi − γ
2
(Ii)
2] dt
}
s.t. : K˙i = Ii − δKi, Ki(0) = K0 i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j.
(2.3.15)
Similar to the previous cases, the HJB equation is used to determine the Cournot feedback
strategies
rVi(Ki, Kj) = max
Ii,qi
[
(A− qi − sqj − ci +Ki + βKj)qi
− γ
2
(Ii)
2 +
∂Vi
∂Ki
(Ii − δKi) + ∂Vi
∂Kj
(φj − δKj)
]
.
(2.3.16)
Differentiating the right-hand side w.r.t. qi and Ii and equating to zero leads to the following
equilibrium.
Proposition 2.3.3 The firms’ Cournot feedback equilibrium output and R&D investment
strategies for Full Integration are given by
qci =
(2− s)A− 2ci + scj + (2− βs)Ki + (2β − s)Kj
4− s2 i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j
IC1 =
1
γ
B1K1 +B3Kj +B4
IC2 =
1
γ
D2K2 +B3K2 +D5,
(2.3.17)
where the coefficients Bi and Di solve the system of equation given by the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation.The value functions are quadratic and symmetric. The structure is shown
in equation 2.2.8.
Proof: See section A.2.
Results for Full Integration
Similar to Partial Integration, competition and spillover effect depend on each other. If
competition intensity is low, spillover increase investment incentives whereas for high intensity
23 Assume downstream firm i is integrated with supplier i.
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spillover decrease incentives. The left picture of Figure 2.4 displays the spillover effect. The
competition effect behaves also in the same way to partial integration where investment
has U-shape without spillover and is declining for higher spillover (see the right picture of
Figure 2.4). The difference to Partial Integration is shown in section 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Competition and spillover effect for Full Integration
2.4 Comparing the vertical structures
In this section the different investment strategies for the three vertical structures are com-
pared. Besides investment, the profitability of an integration is analyzed. Assuming no price
has to be paid to merge the upstream and downstream firm, an integration is profitable if
the profit of the integrated firm is higher than the aggregated profits of the independent firm
without integration. As a final point, consumer surplus and welfare are presented for each
vertical structure. Table 2.2 shows the endogenous integration decisions of the upstream and
downstream firms.
SC2
separate integrate
SC1
separate (VU1 + VD1)
NI (VU2 + VD2)
NI (VU1 + VD1)
PI V PI2
integrate V PI1 (VU2 + VD2)
PI V FI1 V
FI
2
Table 2.2: Supply chain (SC) long-run profits (V1, V2)
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2.4.1 Integration effect
In the absence of R&D investments, the overall effect of vertical integration depends on the
trade off between higher efficiency of production and a lower intensity of competition. The
higher efficiency of production results from an elimination of markups in the supply chain.
The lower intensity of competition on the upstream market, as a result of the integrated
supplier, leads to higher wholesale prices for other supply chains. Which effect prevails and if
a vertical integration increases welfare depends on each single case or rather each parameter
setting.24
By the addition of R&D investments, the results differ in a static and dynamic case. Buehler
and Schmutzler (2008) show that vertical integration enhances the investment incentives for
the integrating firm and decreases investment for the independent firm due to an ”intim-
idation effect”. In the present model existing spillover between the R&D sections, either
independent supplier or integrated supplier, have an effect on incentives. Overall, the inte-
grating firm increases the investment, but the extent depends on the intensity of competition
and spillover. The higher investment results from higher efficiency and sales of the integrated
firm. Partial integration is always negative for the independent supplier, but can be beneficial
for independent or integrated downstream firm to competition and spillover. The next two
subsections provide further details of spillover and competition effect.
2.4.2 Spillover effect
Figure 2.5: Steady state investment and spillover effect
The spillover effect depends on the vertical structure. Without integration, both markets
24 See Buehler and Jaeger (2002), p.140-144.
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are separated and no interaction of both parameters exists. A more competitive downstream
market lowers the demand of the input good and therefore investment incentives are generally
lower. The intensity of competition is always the same (homogeneous good) and an increasing
spillover has two effects. On the one hand the spillover increases knowledge in the industry,
but on the other hand firms reduce investment.25 Figure 2.5 reveals just the latter effect and
as a consequence higher spillover lower investment independent of the competition on the
downstream market. With one or two vertical integrations, both parameters interact with
each other. If one firm is integrated, the integrated firm invests more than the independent
upstream firm (see section 2.4.1). An increasing spillover is supportive if the final good
differentiated but is harmful for more similar goods. The explanation for this contrary
spillover effect results from the vertical structure. The integrated firm is related to upstream
monopolist via spillover and investment of the integrated firm reduces marginal costs of the
monopolist. The lowered costs are passed on to the independent upstream firm via wholesale
price and the impact for the integrated firm depends on the degree of differentiation (s) of the
final products.26 As a result, the vertical structure generates some kind of feedback for own
investment via spillover, supply chain and product differentiation. With Full Integration, the
upstream market is broken up and the integrated firms compete on the same market. If the
competition intensity is low, spillover are encouraging for investment wheres high intensity
is discouraging for investment. The incentives are similar to Partial Integration except that
both supply chains are integrated and the negative feedback is not relaxed by an independent
supply chain.
2.4.3 Competition effect
Figure 2.6 displays the competition effect for all three vertical structures. Without integra-
tion, more similar final products are always discouraging for upstream firms to invest due
to lower demand of the downstream industry. For partial integration, the investment curve
25 Overall, the knowledge for increasing spillover has an inverted U-shape.
26 The line of argument works also the other way around with the wholesale of the integrated firm is
equal to zero. In general, the three firms are connected with each other and each decision (output or
investment) has an effect on the other two firms.
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of the integrated firm shifts from an U-shape to a declining form with higher spillover. The
independent upstream firm reduces always investment for a lower product differentiation in-
dependent of the degree of spillover. The curves of both full integrated firms are U-shaped
without spillover and declining for high spillover.
Figure 2.6: Steady state investment and competition effect
2.4.4 Profitability
Figure 2.7: Initial profits for upstream firms (blue) and downstream
firms (red)
To see the impact of a vertical integration, it is reasonable to start with the initial profits of
the up- and downstream firm. Figure 2.7 shows the initial profits of an upstream firm (blue)
and a downstream firm. In the following treatment a vertical integration is profitable if the
profit of the integrated firm is higher than the profit of the aggregated independent firms.
Due to the integration, the integrated firm has higher incentives to invest in R&D because
the effort is not weakened by a supply chain and the lower cost have an direct effect on
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Figure 2.8: Integration effect for the integrating firm
the success on the downstream market. The profit of the integrated firm is increasing in β
and decreasing in s. In conclusion, the profit of the integrated firm is higher than the profit
of the two independent firms (Figure 2.8). However, can the integration also be beneficial
Figure 2.9: Integration effect for the independent supply chain
for the two independent firms? Thanks to the spillover higher investment of the integrated
firm can lower the cost of the monopolist on the upstream market that can result in a lower
wholesale price for the independent upstream firm. In contrast to this positive effect, the
integration changes the duopoly on the upstream market into a monopoly which results in
higher wholesale prices. The central question is which effect has a bigger impact? Figure 2.9
displays the initial profits and the profits of the independent firms with Partial Integration.
The integration is always costly for the independent downstream firm which is shown in the
left picture by the gray graph. Still, both pictures show an integration can be profitable for
the upstream monopolist if the products are differentiated and the spillover is high.
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Figure 2.10: Full Integration for F1
The profitability of Full Integration for the already integrated firm F1 can be seen in Fig-
ure 2.10. As a result of the eliminated markup the second integrated firm invests more in
R&D which is profitable for the already integrated firm if competition is low and spillover are
high. Therefore, an integration of a competing independent supply chain can be beneficial
or unfavorable for the integrated firm depending on the parameters. Figure 2.11 shows the
profits of the independent supply chain with Partial Integration compared to the profits of
the integrating firm with Full Integration. Obviously, the integrated firm generates higher
profits as the two independent firms but also higher profits as the sum of both profits. In
sum, Full integration is profitable for the already integrated firm for differentiated goods and
higher spillover and is always profitable the independent up- and downstream firm.
Figure 2.11: Full Integration for F2
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2.4.5 Consumer surplus and Welfare
Figure 2.12: Consumer surplus and Welfare
Are vertical integration profitable for the consumers and the welfare? The left picture of
Figure 2.12 shows the consumer surplus for No Integration(blue), Partial Integration(red)
and Full Integration(green). A vertical integration is always beneficial for the consumers
because it eliminates double marginalization and increases investment incentives of the inte-
grating firm. As consequence of the strict preference for consumers and profitability for the
integrating firm, the welfare is maximized for Full Integration.
2.4.6 Intertemporal strategic effect
Instead of static setting, a differential game is used to analyze long-run or intertemporal
strategic effects. To separate the steady state Kssi into an instant and intertemporal effect,
proceed as follows:
The general formulation for the HJB equation for an infinite time horizon differential game
with two state variables Ki, Kj and the own strategy φj is
rVi = Fi(Ki, Kj, φi) +
∂Vi
∂Ki
(φi − δKi) + ∂Vi
∂Kj
(φj − δKj).
Differentiation of the above equation with respect to Ki results in
r∂Vi
∂Ki
=
∂Fi
∂Ki
− δ ∂Vi
∂Ki
+
∂Vi
∂Kj
∂φj
∂Ki
⇔ ∂Vi
∂Ki
=
1
r + δ
(
∂Fi
∂Ki
+
∂Vi
∂Kj
∂φj
∂Ki
)
(2.4.1)
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The structure of the optimal investment strategy for each vertical structures in the steady
state is known.27
maximization problem: I∗i =
1
γ
∂Vi
∂Ki
steady state condition: K˙i = 0 ⇒ Issi = δKssi
Combining both conditions leads to the steady state stock, which is different for all three
cases because of the vertical structure.
⇒ Kssi =
1
δγ
∂Vi(K
ss
i , K
ss
j )
∂Ki
(2.4.2)
By using equation (2.4.1) and (2.4.2), it is possible to split the steady state into a direct,
which occurs also in a static game, and an intertemporal effect. Taking into account the
known partial derivative for each player, the equation can be written as follows
Kss1 =
1
δγ
(
∂F1(K
ss
1 , K
ss
2
∂K1
+ (B2K
ss
2 +B3K
ss
1 +B5)
D3
γ
)
Kss2 =
1
δγ
∂F2(Kss1 , Kss2∂K2︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+ (D1K
ss
1 +D3K
ss
1 +D4)
B3
γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
intertemporal strategic effect(ISE)

(2.4.3)
In the absence of integration and with Full Integration both equations are symmetric, but
for Partial Integration the equations are not symmetric. The intertemporal strategic effect
(ISE) just occurs in differential games and is lacking in a static setting. As a consequence,
firms gain additional knowledge.
Similar to the previous results, the intertemporal strategic effect (ISE) is analyzed for β ∈
[0, 1] and s ∈ [0, 1] for each vertical structure. Figure 2.13 pictures the results. The spillover
β and the competition in combination with the vertical structure are essential for the long-
run investment or knowledge stock. For example, in the absence of integration and low
competition (s small) the ISE is high for low spillover but low for high spillover whereas for
Partial Integration it is the other way around. Thus, the ISE is connected to the vertical
structure. For all three vertical structures the ISE is close to zero if the products are almost
perfect substitutes and knowledge spillover are high. If the ISE is small, the differential
27 See subsections of chapter 2.3
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Figure 2.13: Overall intertemporal strategic effect
game does not differ much from a static setting. To sum up, the extent of the intertemporal
strategic effect depends on the vertical structure, spillover and intensity of competition.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper a differential game is used to show different aspects of vertical integration.
First, vertical integration changes the market structure by eliminating one firm off a market
(upstream market) which affects the remaining up- and downstream firms and their supply
chain. The integrating firm increases his efficiency by eliminating double marginalization
which results in higher investment efforts. The integration is harmful for an independent
downstream firm because of the higher efficiency and lower costs of the integrated firm. In
contrast, if the innovating sections are connected with a knowledge spillover, the integration
can be profitable for an independent upstream firm for differentiated products and higher
spillover. In this case the higher investment of the integrated firm combined with higher
spillover outweighs the lower demand of the independent downstream firm. An integration of
the remaining supply chain is always profitable because of the eliminated double marginal-
ization and raises R&D investment. The already integrated firm can profit as well, if the
spillover and product differentiation are high. All in all, the integration effect, or higher
efficiency, is so strong that every vertical integration is profitable for the integrating firm and
the consumers.
Nevertheless, the model has some restrictions and future research could extent the model
in different aspects. First, in contrast to Buehler and Schmutzler (2008) the model neglects
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integration costs and market size. They show that the relation of both aspects is crucial for
the equilibrium. Depending on both parameters, all three vertical structures can be an equi-
librium outcome. The present model uses just one market size and integration is not costly.
Second, the suppliers produce homogeneous inputs. For the initial setting it is assumed that
the supply of the upstream markets satisfies the demand of the downstream market but not
how units each supplier delivers to each downstream firm.28 Lambertini and Rossini (2003)
assumes that the inputs are different and the demand of the input of two suppliers depends
on the substitutability or product differentiation of the final products. Therefore, the down-
stream firms purchase the inputs of each supplier. This is a possible extension to the present
model and it would be also interesting to analyze if an integrated firm has incentives supply
their competitor. Their model is analyzed for Cournot and Betrand competition which can
result, depending on product differentiation, in different equilibrium outcomes for the vertical
structure.
Finally, the integration takes place perfectly without costs and a loss of efficiency. In general,
the adaption process is not so easy because the production process has to be adjusted to
the new firm. This topic is related to Lambertini and Rossini (2008) and Ishii (2004) where
spillover occur between a upstream and downstream firm. These spillover would vanish with
a vertical integration and therefore separation could be more efficient.
28 To simplify the model and due to a symmetric setting, supplier i satisfies demand of downstream firm i.
Chapter 3
Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR)
3.1 Introduction CSR
The impact of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) for a firm’s competitive position has
gained greater significance in the past ten years (e.g. KPMG, 2011; Ernst & Young, 2011;
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007)). Firms have explored possibilities for CSR activities
to gain a competitive advantage, to choose a strategic level of CSR (e.g. Baron, 2001;
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001, 2011; Fernandez-Kranz and Santalo, 2010). Due to media
coverage of the social efforts (Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012), the public perception of CSR has
increased as well. In addition to the discussion in the scientific literature, CSR is debated in
practice as well. For example, The Economist has published lengthy special reports on CSR
in January 2005 and January 2008. Practitioners link CSR to the ”honorable merchant” who
wants ”long-term economic success without harming the interests of the society”. Accord-
ingly, firms do not act honorable due to moral or altruism but to ”be in business tomorrow”
(Dercks (2013), p. 6). As a result, firms have to take CSR into account to generate long-
term profits. Therefore, we try to answer questions about long-run profitability. First, can
a socially responsible firm outperform a non-social competitor? Second, can social behavior
be a dominant strategy?
In spite of extensive discussions about corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the rising
36
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interest from firms, consumers and stakeholders, a ”general consensus as to what activi-
ties are included under the CSR umbrella has not emerged” (Servaes and Tamayo (2012),
p.2). Baron (2001) argues that ”corporate social responsibility is an ill- and incompletely de-
fined concept”(p. 9). The European Commission (2001) defines CSR as a ”concept whereby
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and their
interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” and ”being social responsible means
not only fulfilling legal expectations, but also going beyond compliance and investing ’more’
into human capital, the environment and the relations with stakeholders”(p. 6). A very
similar definition was proposed by the World business council for sustainable development
(2003): ”CSR is the commitment of a business to contribute to sustainable economic devel-
opment, working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to
improve their quality of life”(p. 5). To sum up, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a
sustainable voluntary effort to accomplish social, economic or environmental goals. Based on
this definition, our model shows the incentives for CSR and the impact for the consumers in
a competitive market.
Due to the imprecise definition of CSR, multiple theoretical approaches exist to model social
behavior. For example, Alves and Santos-Pinto (2008) provide a theory of corporate social
responsibility in a Cournot duopoly where firms can donate a certain amount of money per
each unit sold to social projects to be socially responsible.
Another stream of literature models social behavior from a stakeholder management perspec-
tive with a focus on consumers. Consequently, a the firm’s objective is given by its profit and
a fraction of consumer surplus. This approach was applied to delegation models by Goering
(2007) and extended by Kopel and Brand (2012, 2013). Furthermore, Goering (2012) argues
that ”this definition of CSR implies the firm is willing to accept less profits to act in a more
social concerned manner” (p. 144). Therefore, CSR is costly. In a mixed market with a pri-
vate for-profit firm, a public firm and a ”commercial” non-profit organization (NPO) which
differ in their respective objective function, Goering (2008) finds that the technical efficiency,
or production costs of each firm, are crucial in determining whether social welfare rises or
falls as the NPO places more weight on the consumer surplus. Besides market competition,
this approach has also been applied to supply chain management. Goering (2012) analyzes
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a bilateral monopoly where either the manufacturer with a two-part tariff or the retailer
can be socially concerned. Brand and Grothe (2013) extend the paper such that both firms
can be socially concerned. In a further model, Brand and Grothe (2014) analyze a bilateral
monopoly with an imperfectly coordinated marketing channel. There they show, that firms’
social concern results in a Pareto-improvement due to a weakened double marginalization
problem.
Several papers highlight the strategic use of CSR where ”CSR attributes are like any other
attributes a firm offers” (McWilliams and Siegel (2001), p. 125) to improve the performance
of the firm. They discuss a general supply and demand model and figure out which param-
eters are positive or negative related to CSR efforts. Baron (2001) uses strategic CSR as
firms’ reaction to social concerns where they can donate an additional amount for environ-
mental issues for each unit sold. Firms react to a threat of activists who want to change
the production practices of the firm. A first-mover advantage of CSR activities for a socially
responsible firm and the necessary conditions are examined by Kopel (2009).
Complementary to these static models, different authors consider the long-term effect of
strategic CSR and whether it is sustainable. For example, Lundgren (2011) investigates an
optimal control problem of a socially responsible firm where CSR investment has a positive
effect on the goodwill stock. The dynamic approach is carried on by Wirl (2013) and Wirl
et al. (2013). The latter asks why CSR waves can be observed. Starting with an intertem-
poral optimization problem of a social firm, they add interaction with competitors which
is essential: If CSR is profitable for one firm, it may be profitable for the competitors as
well. Strategic interactions w.r.t to CSR activities are the focus of Wirl (2013). He investi-
gates the differences of open-loop and Markov perfect Nash equilibria with the cooperation
as a benchmark. Becchetti et al. (2012) combine the idea of Hotelling (1929) and dynamic
CSR investment. A profit maximizing firm faces a non-profit socially responsible competitor.
The location model of Hotelling represents a ”ethical segment” [0, 1] where consumers are
heterogeneous towards social and environmental features of the final good. The non-profit
social firm is located at one and the monopolist can decide endogenously about its location
or degree of social responsibility which increases the production costs but long-run CSR in-
vestment is more efficient. Therefore, social behavior is a response to the competition of a
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non-profit firm.
The strategic CSR approach is not without problems. For example, Baron (2001) argues:
”A firm motivated only by profits may adopt a practice labeled as socially responsible because
it increases the demand for its product. This strategic CSR is simply profit-maximization
strategy motivated by self interest and not by conception of corporate social responsibility.”
(p. 9). Nevertheless, we pick up the idea about endogenous CSR investment, additional
marginal costs and competition and use CSR investment as a positive signal to advance the
goodwill of consumers. Based on the idea of Nerlove and Arrow (1962), each firm can make
costly investment in order to raise its own goodwill (reputation or brand equity). The higher
the own goodwill stock the higher are the current sales. In a duopoly, both firms must decide
initially if they want to invest in a socially responsible or non-socially responsible way. We
want to examine the following points:
• What differentiates socially responsible strategies from other investment strategies?
Motivated by practical examples, we give a definition of socially responsible investment.
• Does socially responsible behavior lead to an economic advantage? Furthermore, are
socially responsible firms able to outperform a non-social competitor?
• Which combination of firm strategies is optimal for consumers by means of consumer
surplus?
Initially, two firms decide if they want to invest socially responsible or not over an infinite
time horizon. Both investments create goodwill of consumers but in contrast to non-social
investment, social investment raises the production costs as well. However, social investment
is more sustainable which results in a lower depreciation of the goodwill stock. Referring
to the literature, we use CSR as strategic investment. Within a differential game we derive
the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) given their initial decision about social behavior. The
results show that the initial decision of the firms depends on the relation of additional cost
from social investment and the sustainability of the goodwill stock. Overall, either both firms
invest socially or none. If business stealing attracts consumers from the competitor, the firms
may end up in a prisoner’s dilemma. Consumers’ point of view deviates from firms’ point of
view, but could prevent firms from the prisoner’s dilemma under certain circumstances.
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Our paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the framework. Afterwards, we show
equilibria and consumer surplus in section 3.3. The last section of our paper concludes and
discusses future research.
3.2 Framework
Two firms compete with differentiated products and decide initially about their firm label.
They can either spend their money to create a product which is produced socially responsi-
ble, like ”fair-trade” products, and use their social label to attract new consumers or choose
advertising to grab the consumers attention for a product without a socially concerned pro-
duction process. The term ”social” or ”socially responsible/concerned” indicates that a firm
cares about social or environmental problems during the production process. Social behavior
in our model meets the following criteria which are in line with the literature about corpo-
rate social responsibility. First, social responsibility is used as an investment strategy (CSR
investment) that creates a social label for a product (e.g. ”fair-trade” label) or reputation
for the firm. A CSR investment enhances the quality of the product and differentiates (verti-
cally) the product from its competitors. Second, CSR investment is a ”visible strategy” to its
stakeholders. Visibility is important to use it strategically and to change the beliefs of firms,
customers and other stakeholders.1 Therefore, CSR investment is a mix of different strate-
gies (quality improvement, advertising etc.) to build up reputation. For example, firms may
decide to change their range of products to ”fair-trade”-products or pay their workers higher
wages compared to their competitors with the intention of creating a long-run competitive
advantage in order to maximize profits.2
Advertising as a non-social strategy can build up reputation as well. What is the difference
between a non-social and social strategy? We define a CSR strategy as a long-term and sus-
tainable investment compared to a non-social strategy. If a firm sells ”fair-trade” products or
pays higher wages, the short-run production costs go up and CSR effort results in a short-run
disadvantage. In contrast to a non-social strategy, CSR investment is more sustainable due
1 Without visibility the consumers would not recognize the social products or projects. We follow Kopel
(2009) and use similar arguments.
2 In contrast to some works about corporate social responsibility, firm’s objective is to maximize profits.
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to the visibility of the product. Consumers reward CSR effort in the future with a price
premium and the short-run disadvantage can convert into a long-run advantage.3 To analyze
short- and long-term effects, the problem is modeled in a differential game where we analyze
incentives towards social and non-social investment.
Similar to Singh and Vives (1984) consumers are able to purchase two differentiated products
and maximize their respective utility function
U = α(q1 +q2)+(mG1 +β(G1−G2))q1 +(mG2 +β(G2−G1))q2−0.5(q21 +q22)−sq1q2. (3.2.1)
Gi represents the additional utility created by firm i with social or non-social investment.
Maximization with respect to the products subject to a budget constraint yields the inverse
demand system
p1 = α− q1 − sq2+ mG1 + β(G1 −G2)
p2 = α− q2 − sq1+ mG2︸︷︷︸
market extension
+ β(G2 −G1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
business stealing
.
mGi indicates the market extension or the new consumers induced by the goodwill stock of
firm i whereas β shows the impact of business stealing when firms have different goodwill
stocks.4 Moreover, the inverse demand pi depends on the reservation price α, the quantity
qi and the degree of product differentiation s.
pi = α− qi − sqj + (m+ β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:d
Gi − βGj, i = 1, 2; i 6= j (3.2.2)
Thus, the ratio 0 ≤ β
d
≤ 1 indicates the effect of market extension and business stealing. The
firms can build up the reputation Gi, which creates a price premium by social or non-social
investment.
Initially, firms have to decide endogenously about their image: Are they social responsible
or not? Firms cannot switch their strategy afterwards. The next section specifies the
maximization problems for a non-social and a socially responsible firm.
3 In our model, the reward by the market respectively by the consumers is a long term advantage and is
covered by a lower depreciation rate of the goodwill stock.
4 Business stealing just occurs when the firms choose different strategies.
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3.2.1 Profit maximizing firm (PMF)
A firm without social investments is called profit maximizing firm (PMF) from now on. In
contrast to a socially responsible firm (SRF), the PMF tries to increase the reputation of its
product by standard advertising instruments.5 In line with the differential game literature,
more precisely capital accumulation games (Dockner et al. (2000), chapter 9), the reputation
is modeled as a goodwill stock and investment I raises the reputation or goodwill respectively
G˙i(t) = I(t)− δGi(t). Nerlove and Arrow (1962) use advertising as their investment strategy
and analyze a dynamic optimization problem for one firm. Multiple authors picked up the idea
of ”advertising goodwill models” and extended Nerlove and Arrow (1962) to an oligopolistic
market or different dynamics.6 Advertising A is used to describe a non-social investment and
to improve the reputation of the PMF. Consequently, the maximization problem of the PMF
is
max
pi,Ai
Πi =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt[(pi − ci))qi − γ
2
A2i ] dt
s.t. G˙PMi = Ai − δPMi GPMi , GPMi (0) = G0
(3.2.3)
where γ
2
is the cost parameter for advertising efforts.
3.2.2 Socially responsible firm (SRF)
Social investment causes R&D costs and production costs as well.7 R&D, even though
it causes costs, is necessary to find possibilities for CSR investment and to publish them
afterwards. The argumentation of increasing production costs is in line with social behavior.
For example, if a firm pays their employees higher wages compared to rival firms to create
a social image, the additional wage raises the production costs of the product. ”Fair-trade”
5 In our setting, the socially responsible firm is profit maximizer as well but takes social or environmental
issues into account to increase its reputation.
6 An overview of advertising goodwill models can be found in Jøgensen and Zaccour (2004), chapter 3.5
or Dockner et al. (2000), chapter 11.
7 This property is similar to De Giovanni (2011) where investment of the manufacturer improves the
product quality. In contrast to our model, De Giovanni (2011) examines a supply chain where the
goodwill is the sum of quality improvement d(t) by the manufacturers and advertising effort A(t) of the
retailer G˙ = A(t) + γd(t)− δG(t).
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products are a second example for this argumentation. Due to the fair trade, the retailer
pays a higher wholesale price which results in higher costs. If a firms wants to change its
product range to ”fair-trade” products, it has to take higher costs into account. Nevertheless,
a socially responsible firm (SRF) is still profit maximizing but willing to sacrifice short-run
profits for future compensation. The advantage of CSR investment is its sustainability which
appears in a lower depreciation rate (δSR < δPM) for the goodwill stock.
8 This can be a result
of word-of-mouth effects of the employees or the visibility of the social product (social label).
Overall, the maximization problem of a socially responsible firm is
max
pi,CSRi
Πi =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt[(pi − (ci + w CSRi)))qi − γ
2
(CSRi)
2] dt
s.t. G˙SRi = CSRi − δSRi GSRi , GSRi (0) = G0, w ≥ 0, δSRi ≤ δPMi
(3.2.4)
where w indicates the impact of CSR investment on production costs.
Therefore, firms have to examine the market conditions and have to decide if they rather act
socially responsible or not. Assuming a non-cooperative mode of play, Table 3.1 summarizes
the possible outcomes and value functions for the two player game. Each player can be
socially responsible (SR) or profit maximizing (PM).
Firm 2
PM SR
Firm 1
PM V PM1 V PM2 V PM1 V SR2
SR V SR1 V PM2 V SR1 V SR2
Table 3.1: Value functions (V1, V2) depending on social commitment
For all possible outcomes, the setting is an infinite horizon linear quadratic (goodwill or
capital accumulation) game. The players have two control variables, the price pi ≥ ci and
their investment I or CSR, to impact sales and their respective goodwill stocks Gji (t) ≥ 0, i =
8 The depreciation rates indicate aging or forgetting effects. The underlying argumentation suggests that
social investment is more sustainable due to the visibility of the social behavior.
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1, 2, j ∈ {PM,SR}. Due to the complexity of the system when one or both firms select
social investments, the Markov perfect equilibria are analyzed numerically in section 3.3.9
3.3 Numerical calculation
To calculate profits, equilibria and consumer surplus, we fix the following parameter setting
α = 1, ci = 0.1, s = 0.4, δ
PM = 0.4, γ = 20, r = 0.07,
and create an array of different values for the social depreciation rate (δSR) and the impact
of CSR on production costs w. The array for the numerical calculation is
w ∈ [0, 0.9], δSR ∈ [0.3, 0.4],
where the step size for w is 0.1 and for δSR is 0.01.10 Finally, we calculate the w − δSR-
array for different values of the market extension-business stealing ratio β
d
with a fixed d and
different values for β:
d = 1 and β = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9.
3.3.1 Stability and transversality condition
Independent of the choice of the firms w.r.t. their types, the underlying system is a time
autonomous linear quadratic game with two linear differential equations
G˙j1 = I1 − δj1Gj1
G˙j2 = I2 − δj2Gj2
 with Ii, Gi ≥ 0 (3.3.1)
where Ii ∈ {Ai, CSRi} and j ∈ {PM,SR}. If we substitute Ii with the optimal investment
following from the HJB equations (see appendix B.2.1, B.2.2 and B.2.3), the system can be
9 The best reply functions for each case can be found in appendix B.2.1 to B.2.3.
10 Due to the setting, the CSR investments are not defined for the case (SRF, SRF) and w = 0. When no
additional costs w occur, it is always better to be socially responsible. Thus, we calculate the profits for
w = 0.001 instead of w = 0 to create the array and restrict our observations and statements to the case
w > 0.
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rewritten as G˙1
G˙2
 =
k11 k12
k21 k22
G1
G2
+
R1
R2
 (3.3.2)
If |K| 6= 0, the system has a unique fixed point (Gss1 , Gss2 ). Only equilibrium values who
are globally asymptotically stable are allowed for numerical calculation. If the fixed point is
globally asymptotically stable, the transversality condition, where Vi is bounded from below
and
lim
t→∞
e−rtV (Gi(t), Gj(t), t) ≤ 0, (3.3.3)
is satisfied as well.
3.3.2 Profits and equilibria
Given the previous parameter setting, we calculate the overall profits and resulting equilibria
for different degrees of business stealing β. If β is small (or equal to zero), goodwill stocks
are almost independent and consumers pay a price premium for both products. If β is large,
the consumers just pay a price premium for the firm with the higher goodwill stock and
the firm with the lower stock looses consumers to its competitor. Figure 3.1 displays the
value functions with a low impact of business stealing β = 0.1. The green graph of Fig-
Figure 3.1: Profits for β = 0.1
ure 3.1 shows the profits for the symmetric setting (PMF,PMF) and the orange graph for
(SRF,SRF). The profits for the PMF and SRF in an asymmetric setting (PMF,SRF) are
shown with the blue and red graph respectively. The profits for β = 0.5 and β = 0.9 are
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calculated similarly and can be found in the appendix B.3. The resulting equilibria for dif-
ferent degrees of business stealing can be observed in Figure 3.2. The dark line indicates two
Figure 3.2: Equilibria with respect to β
coinciding thresholds. The first threshold indicates the incentive of a PMF to switch to social
investment in a symmetric profit maximizing setting (PMF,PMF). If the w-δSR combination
is below the threshold, profits for a SRF competing with a PMF is superior to competition
between PMFs. Consequently, PMFs have incentives to deviate from a symmetric setting
(PMF,PMF) to an asymmetric setting (SRF,PMF). For points above the threshold firms fa-
vor non-social investment because social investment is too expensive in the short-run or not
sustainable enough or both. The second threshold illustrates incentives for firms to deviate
from an asymmetric setting towards the symmetric social setting. If the w-δSR point is below
the threshold, a firm goes for a symmetric social setting (SRF,SRF) instead of being a PMF
in an asymmetric setting (PMF,SRF) and the other way around if the point is above the
threshold. Since both thresholds coincide, two equilibria emerge. A symmetric equilibrium
with two PMFs (PMF,PMF) exists if the w-δSR combination is above the thresholds whereas
for points below the threshold (SRF,SRF) is an equilibrium.
The second picture of Figure 3.2 presents the effect of an increase in business stealing, mean-
ing, a more competitive environment (business stealing) where a higher goodwill stock dis-
tracts consumers from the competitor if both firms choose different strategies. Contrary to
the initial case, both thresholds move upwards. Due to the more competitive environment,
both firms have higher incentives to take advantage of the social investment and competitors
must counter the deviation as well.
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In a highly competitive environment with high business stealing effects β = 0.9 , the thresh-
olds move further upwards and enlarge the area of the social equilibrium. For this setting, it
can be observed that both thresholds do not coincide for a low depreciation rate δSR and a
high cost parameter w. As a result, for parameters in the white area two equilibria coexist
where either two firms are profit maximizing firms or both are socially responsible.
Overall, only symmetric equilibria occur where both firms are either socially responsible or
profit maximizing firms. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to analyze which of the two equilibria
the firms prefer. More generally, are the equilibria the best possible outcome or would the
firms choose other strategies if they were able to coordinate their commitment about social
behavior? The following subsections cover this question and the consumers point of view.
3.3.3 Prisoner’s dilemma
The profits and equilibria in a competitive market when firm act non-cooperatively were
shown in the previous section. It remains to be seen if the equilibria are the preferred outcome
when firms can collude their social decision but set prices and investment independently
to maximize their profits. The following results arise from the bimatrix game, shown in
Figure 3.1, when firms can coordinate their decision about social behavior. Figure 3.3 reveals
the results for different intensities of business stealing.
Figure 3.3: Collusive outcome and prisoner’s dilemma
It can be seen in Figure 3.3 that a collusive setup with respect to the decision about so-
cial behavior deviates from the non-cooperative setup. The darker colors indicate that the
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equilibria do not coincide with the preferred outcome. Meaning, in a cooperative setting
with respect to the social decision both firms are better off if they do not choose the equi-
librium strategy (social or non-social). Consequently, non-cooperative behavior results in a
”prisoner’s dilemma” for both firms which intensifies for higher business stealing effects.
3.3.4 Consumer surplus and contrast to equilibrium
Since CSR is always related to consumers or welfare it is important to analyze the consumers
surplus and which setting consumers prefer. As stated in the introduction, Goering (2008)
brought up the idea to model social behavior by the objective V = pi + θCS. Comparing
consumer surplus and equilibria from competition, we might get an idea how the results
would deviate if the consumers have some voting power about the social behavior of the firm.
Figure 3.4 displays the CS for β = 0.1 and Figure 3.5 shows the preferred outcome when
Figure 3.4: Consumer surplus for β = 0.1
consumer can pick the type of firm. The CS calculated for β = 0.5 and β = 0.9 can be found
in the appendix B.3. Depending on the impact of business stealing, consumers want social,
non-social or a mix of both as preferred setting. The color purple (yellow) expresses: both
firms should be social (non-social) from the consumers’ point of view. It is colored cyan if
both firms should choose different strategies. Whether the consumers’ point of view deviates
from the firms’ point of view depends on the cost parameters and the impact of business
stealing. Figure 3.6 compares the scenarios where firms and consumers coincide or deviate.
The following insights can be observed:
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Figure 3.5: Consumer surplus
(a) β = 0.1 (b) β = 0.5 (c) β = 0.9
Figure 3.6: Comparing equilibrium outcome and consumer preferences
(I) Consumers prefer non-social firms which corresponds to the equilibrium.
(II) Each firm invests in social projects whereas consumers wish they would not. Although
both deviate, the firms should listen to consumers because that would avoid the pris-
oner’s dilemma. An integration of the consumers point of view is beneficial for the
consumers and the firms as well. This includes also the case when both symmetric
equilibria are possible.11
(III) Both firms are socially concerned which is also the best market structure for the con-
sumers.
11 In contrast to our point of view, where CSR is social investment, another stream of literature incorporates
a fraction of consumer surplus into firm’s objective. Here, we try to link both approaches.
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(IV) In contrast to the socially concerned firms, the consumers prefer two different types of
firms. If the firms use different investment strategies, the socially concerned firm would
be better off and the non-social firm would receive less profit.
Overall, the different point of views lead to the following insights. First, although the firms
are socially responsible, it is not in the best interest of the consumers. Socially responsible
investments are not beneficial for consumers ((II) and (IV)). Second, for some setups the
prisoner’s dilemma can be avoided if the firms take the consumers’ point of view into account.
It is beneficial for consumers and firms if investment is non-social ((II)). Business stealing
creates or reinforces both effects.
3.4 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this work was to establish socially responsible investment strategies and to
differentiate them from non-social strategies, such as advertising, to draw the attention of
the consumers by assembling goodwill of the consumers. Initially, firms have to decide if they
want to be labeled as social or non-social firm. A social firm has to invest in social projects
which, compared to non-social investment, are more sustainable but increases the production
costs as well. Afterwards, firms choose their prices and respective strategic investments non-
cooperatively in a duopoly with differentiated products. Consequently, either symmetric
firms, both are socially concerned or profit maximizing, or asymmetric firms, one socially
responsible and one profit maximizing, compete in the market. The Markovian strategies
and profits are derived numerically for the three possible outcomes.
The results show that the ratio of lower social depreciation rate δSR and additional costs w
is crucial for social incentives and the threshold is increasing in β. Although the thresholds
do not necessarily coincide for symmetric or asymmetric market structure, we finish in a
symmetric social or non-social equilibrium. In addition, business stealing creates a prisoner’s
dilemma for the firms: They end up in a symmetric social (non-social) equilibrium but favor
a symmetric non-social (social) equilibrium. With low business stealing, β = 0.1, the firms
desire the equilibrium outcome but the prisoner’s dilemma intensifies with an increasing
business stealing effect. In contrast to the firms, the consumers would choose a different
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market structure. The higher β the less preferable is social investment for consumers. The
results are in line with the works of Wirl et al. (2013) and Wirl (2013) where both firms
are symmetric by assumption. Even if the firms can decide endogenously about their social
behavior, the firms choose the same strategy depending on the market parameters. If one
firm has an incentive to implement a socially responsible strategy, the competitor has an
incentive to do so as well. As a result, the duopolistic setting confirms the results of Wirl et al.
(2013) and Wirl (2013) that either all or no firm is socially responsible and no asymmetric
equilibrium with social and non-social firms occur.
The observations can be summarized as follows: First, supported by practical examples,
we define social investment as a more sustainable but also a more costly strategy. Second,
the preferred investment depends on the market parameters and no asymmetric equilibrium
occur. If one firm has an incentive for a different investment strategy, the competitor has an
incentive as well. Third, business stealing creates a prisoner’s dilemma for the firms. Taking
the consumers’ point of view into account may help to avoid the dilemma and therefore,
can be beneficial for firms and consumers. Fourth, the higher the business stealing effect
the more the consumers’ preferred market structure and equilibrium market structure differ.
In our setting, we assume that the firms decide about their behavior once - either to be
profit-maximizing or socially concerned - but are not able to switch from one to another.
Therefore, further research could analyze the effects of a switching behavior. In addition, our
analysis is concentrated on a simultaneous strategy choice concerning the firms’ strategies.
In line with Kopel (2009) an extension of our model would be the analysis of the sequential
strategy choice of the two firms which would be possible within a multi-mode game approach
with monopoly and duopoly periods.
Chapter 4
Software Platform Competition
4.1 Motivation
Although open source development accompanies computer development, the emergence of
portable and web-enabled devices (e.g. notebook, smartphone, tablet) has supported open
source development. As a result, open source software (OSS) has gained a significant market
share in several software markets (operating system, internet browser, office suite, applica-
tions etc.). Depending on the market, either proprietary or open source software dominate
the market.1 As an example, Figure 4.1 shows the market share of the operating system on
mobile and desktop platforms. The desktop market is dominated by a proprietary software
(Windows) whereas the majority of users in the mobile sector use an open source platform
(Android). What are the reasons for each high market share? What are the conditions for a
strong diffusion of a software? To the best of my knowledge, no model has covered the case
when a closed source firm and an open source firm enter the market at different times.
In general, innovators gain a first-mover advantage and are able to extract monopolistic prof-
its. As a result, innovating firms prevent competitors from their discoveries, either by not
disclosing their innovations or by means of a patent.
1 Proprietary software is developed by a commercial firm and sold to consumers for a price larger than
zero.
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(a) Source: StatCounter (April 2014) (b) Source: Gartner (February 2014)
Figure 4.1: Market share of desktop platforms and sales of mobile plat-
forms
4.1.1 Literature review
Since the emergence of open source software, research tries to explain the individual user mo-
tivation to contribute to open source products and the commercial motivation to contribute
or support open source development. Lerner and Tirole (2001, 2002, 2005) discuss the moti-
vation of programmers and commercial firms to engage in open source projects. In addition to
programmer incentives, Schiff (2002) studies also business models used by profit maximizing
firms. In contrast to user incentives, the main drivers for firms to contribute to open source
are selling complementary services, building greater innovative capability and cost reduction
through open sourcing to an external community (Andersen-Gott et al. (2012)). Firms are
willing to support open source development if it creates a compatibility between the open
source product and the commercial product of the firms, because compatibility increases
the willingness of consumers to pay for the commercial product (Mustonen (2005)). Kort
and Zaccour (2011) continue with this topic and examine the strategic interactions of open
source software and complementary products in a duopoly framework. If the software market
is competitive and the complementary product market is less competitive, firms are willing
to open the source code. Open source (OS) software is not restricted to compatibility to
commercial products, it can be necessary to sell commercial products if the OS software is an
operating system (Linux, Android). Some papers focus on competition between open source
and proprietary systems but assume that open source firms realize no profits (Casadesus-
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Masanell and Ghemawat (2006), Economides and Katsamakas (2006)). However, studies by
Bonaccorsi et al. (2006); Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2006) show that firms use ”hybrid business
models in the open source software industry” to enter the market and are profit maximizing
firms. Even if they do not owe the OS software, interested commercial groups support the
OS movement (Haruvy et al. (2005), p. 198). Similarly, Lanzi (2009) studies duopolistic
competition between proprietary and open source software and how learning and adaption
costs of open source software for consumers affect diffusion of the open source software. Al-
though proprietary and open source systems compete, the OS system is non-profitable as
well.2 In several works Haruvy et al. (2005, 2008a, 2008b) examine OS development in a
competitive environment. They show that user involvement and compatibility between rival
products have a positive effect on profits and that open source development can arise from
competitive climate with two firms. Even though firms decide endogenously about their
business model (open or closed source), they argue that a firm has no incentive to invest in
open source software if the competitor closes its source code. A common component is shared
and developed in an open source project to increase each demand. If ”one firm chooses to
close its code, the two source codes for the common component are no longer shared” and it
simplifies to the closed source case.3 As a result, either both firms open or close their source
code depending on cost parameters. Contrary, Bonaccorsi et al. (2006) show empirically
that firms have adopted to an environment dominated by incumbent standards by choosing
hybrid business models with proprietary and OS software. The coexistence of open source
and proprietary firms is confirmed by Llanes and De Elejalde (2013) when firms sell packages
composed of a primary and a complementary good. Even when firms decide endogenously
about their software type, prices and innovation, coexistence can arise as an equilibrium.
They determine the conditions for the coexistence for both software types but they exclude
user innovation to software quality. The incentive to change the business model from open
source to closed source are studied by Lambardi (2009) and Caulkins et al. (2013). The
former considers how innovation investment in a software duopoly is affected by the fact that
2 More precisely, a profit-oriented firm competes with the OS community that develops for free and wants
to maximize the users of the OS software.
3 Closing the source code and taking the code from the competitor to incorporate to its common component
without opening its own source code can not be an equilibrium (see Haruvy et al. (2005), p. 205)
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one firm is, or might become, open source whereas the latter considers the timing to open
the source code.
4.1.2 Research idea
Comparable to Llanes and De Elejalde (2013), an open source and a closed source firm sell
packages of software (operating system) and a complementary good (hardware). Initially,
the closed source firm acts as a monopolist and the open source software firm enters at time
τ > 0. Users can contribute to the quality of the open source product similar to Haruvy et
al. (2005, 2008a, 2008b). How does the timing and the market structure affect the diffusion
process of the open source software product? Within a multi-mode differential game the
following research questions are central.
• What are the conditions for successful market penetration of an operating system (com-
pare Windows/Linux and iOS/Android)?
• What is the optimal behavior of a software incumbent with respect to prices and in-
vestment when threatened by an OS firm entry? Is market deterrence possible?
• Do OS firms contribute more or less to innovation IOS ≷ IPS? Do user contributions
substitute or complement R&D efforts by firms?
Firms sell packages composed of a primary good (the operating system) and a complementary
good (hardware).4 Subsequently, open source users can contribute to the quality of the
open source software. Within a multi-mode differential game where a proprietary software
monopolist is threatened by an open source entrant in mode 1 (monopoly mode). The entry
depends on an exogenously given switching rate λ and can occur at any time. After the
entry, the system switches to mode 2 (duopoly mode) where the proprietary and open source
firm compete in prices in a differentiated market. The results show that the anticipation
of an entry leads to lower prices and higher sales in the monopoly period. The higher the
expected level of competition, the lower the prices in the monopoly mode. Additionally, the
proprietary software firm has higher investment incentives to increase its market power if a
4 Underlying assumption: The consumer sticks to using the installed operating system.
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quality advantage creates business stealing and lower incentives in case of positive quality
externalities occur. The threat of user contributions lowers the monopoly price further. In
general, the objective of this paper is to investigate the conditions to establish an open
source operating system while the market entry is delayed. Section 4.2 shows the details of
the multi-mode differential game. The numerical results are presented in section 4.3. The
focus of the numerical calculation is set on the impact of entry, product differentiation and
durability. Finally, section 4.4 summarizes the main implications of the analysis and presents
topics for future research.
4.2 Framework
4.2.1 Business model and incentives
Despite a recent discussion about open source software, an essential definition is lacking in
the literature. Schiff (2002) states very general that ”open source software can be modi-
fied, extended, adapted, and incorporated into other programs by other programmers, without
paying a fee to any previous contributers to the software” (p. 67). While picking up early
contributions from Raymond (1999a,b) and Schiff (2002), Haruvy et al. (2008b) is able to
identify four open source business models: the market positioner model, the compatible hard-
ware model, the service and support model and the information model. In addition, Haruvy
et al. (2008b) define open source as ”an active tool for improving the quality of the software
or platform” and development is ”less expensive and more rapid in the open source model”
(p. 30).
The subsequent model uses a competitive entry model similar to Eliashberg and Jeuland
(1986), but with the extension of quality competition. Firms sell packages of software and
compatible hardware to consumers. A proprietary software firm sells its product immediately
and the open source software competitor enters the market after a period τ . The open source
(OS) firm uses the market positioner business model to create a higher market penetration
rate, to establish its brand and to compensate a delayed entry. The benefit of open source
software are no costs in contrast to additional fees for buying the proprietary software from the
software incumbent. Additionally, the development of the open source software is accelerated
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due to the contributions of the users, but less users are available due to the delayed entry.
4.2.2 Market structure
In general, consumers purchase the product of the proprietary or the open source software
firm which maximizes their utility. Both firms compete with each other and try to generate a
high market share for their products (software platforms). Inspired by market share models,
both products are similar to durable goods to the effect that consumers decide about their
preferred product (platform) and buy it once. As a consequence, the market size is shrinking
over time.
Demand dynamics: In the absence of quality competition, both firms sell differentiated
products, which can be illustrated by the following standard linear inverse demand
function
pi = A− qi − sqj
where 0 < s < 1 is the degree of horizontal differentiation. The number of consumers
who want to buy the respective software is represented by the reservation price A.5
Hence, the market size is indirectly described by A because the higher the reservation
price, the more consumers are willing to purchase either product. For this reason,
the total market size for both products is given by 2
1+s
A if both products have the
same reservation price (A1 = A2 = A) and in the absence of quality. The smaller
the differentiation, the smaller the initial market. The consumers buy their preferred
platform depending on software quality and market price and stick to their system
afterwards. Similar to durable goods and renewable resources, the market size is a
stock, which decreases generally with the number of sales. The market size is renewable
because of an external growth rate and firm investments. Nevertheless, the market
size is unmodified6 by the entry and determines substantially price and investment
incentives. The focus of this model is on the diffusion process of proprietary and
5 A is the reservation price in the absence of quality competition.
6 The entry of an open source competitor does not expand the overall market size. Instead, the remaining
consumers are divided equally between both firms.
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open source software. For this reason, the consumers make their decisions about their
preferred system and stick with their decisions afterwards. As a consequence, the
market size adjusts with respect to the sales of each firm and the resulting demand
dynamic is
A˙ = −1 + s
2
(D1(p1, p2) +D2(p1, p2)) + δ
AA, A0 > 0. (4.2.1)
δA represents the external growth rate of the market. 1+s
2
is the inverse of the total
market size and the dynamic of A expresses the market saturation caused by the dif-
fusion process of the products. Consumers purchase their preferred software and stick
to their product from now on.
Network: After buying the open source product, consumers can contribute to the quality
of the open source product subsequently.7 The disadvantage of the delayed entry for
the open source software firm can be compensated by user network contributions. The
network of open source user N is generated by sales and the exit rate δN of the network.
N˙ = D2(p1, p2)− δNN (4.2.2)
Quality: In contrast to horizontal differentiation, the firms have to build up the quality
Ki endogenously by investment Ii and according to their respective state equation K˙i.
The quality of the proprietary software K1 relies just on the investment of its firm I1
whereas the quality of the open source software depends on firm investment I2 and
network contributions θN . For this reason, the quality and network dynamics are
K˙1 = I1 − δKK1
K˙2 = θN + I2 − δKK2.
(4.2.3)
Each investment Ii causes R&D costs
γ
2
I2i .
Utility function: Overall, both products are vertically and horizontally differentiated. The
respective quantity of each product is qi. The parameter 0 < s < 1 indicates the
7 By assumption, only consumers who prefer the opens source product are willing to contribute to the
quality.
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horizontal differentiation and is exogenously given. Ki illustrates the quality of each
product. The significance of the quality regarding the respective utility function
U(q1, q2) = (A+d(K1−βK2))q1 +(A+d(K2−βK1))q2−0.5q21−0.5q22−sq1q2), (4.2.4)
is measured by d. β shows the competitive effect of the quality. If β is smaller than
zero, quality externalities influence the demand positively, whereas a β larger than zero
creates business stealing. Subsequently, the respective demand functions for each firm
are
D1(p1, p2) =
(1− s)A− p1 + sp2 + d[(1 + sβ)K1 − (s+ β)K2]
1− s2
D2(p1, p2) =
(1− s)A− p2 + sp1 + d[(1 + sβ)K2 − (s+ β)K1]
1− s2 .
(4.2.5)
Timing: To return to the initial motivation, a firm takes the first-mover advantage to gen-
erate monopoly profit and closes the source code to prevent an entry or make an entry
as hard as possible. Motivated by different software markets (desktop platforms, mo-
bile platforms (cell phone and tablets)), the proprietary software firm has a first-mover
advantage (Windows, iOS) and is able to make a monopoly profit until the open source
software firm (Linux, Android) enters the market. The different entry times are de-
signed by a multi-mode game with a monopoly and a duopoly mode (see section 4.2.3).
During the monopoly mode, only the proprietary software firm sells its product at the
market and the demand structure (4.2.5) and market dynamics (4.2.1) adjust to
D1(p1) = A− p1 + dK1
A˙ = −D1(p1) + δAA.
(4.2.6)
Initially at time t = 0, the proprietary software firm F1 is a monopolist on the market.
At time τ an open source competitor F2 enters the market with its differentiated product
and both firms compete in prices.8 Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986) differentiate between
a myopic, non-myopic and surprised monopolist, who does not foresee the entry of the
8 Generally, open source software is for free and firms earn money with complementary services, but in
this model firms sell bundles of soft- and hardware. Open source software is characterized by a delayed
entry and user contributions.
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competitor. A myopic monopolist discounts the duopoly period whereas the non-myopic
monopolist predicts the entry time perfectly. In contrast to their three approaches, the
OS firm entry can happen at any time and the proprietary software firm maximizes
its expected profit with the conditional probability λ(t) that the OS firm enters the
market given the entry has not occurred so far. The entry time is denoted by τ and is
exponentially distributed with switching rate9 λ(t) > 0. The switching rate is defined
as
λ(t) = lim
t→∞
1
∆
Prob{m(t+ ∆) = m2 | m(t) = m1} (4.2.7)
where m1 is the monopoly mode with the proprietary software firm and m2 the duopoly
mode with both firms. In order to focus on market and quality dynamics for the
analysis, the exponential distribution of entry is assumed to be exogenous. Nevertheless,
different switching rates are used to analyze the relation between expected entry time
and the control variables.
4.2.3 Objectives and dynamics for each firm
The proprietary software firm chooses its price and investment in order to maximize its
discounted profits over an infinite time horizon. Denoting the discount rate by r > 0 and the
marginal costs by ci, the objective function of the proprietary software firm is given by
max
p1,I1
Π1 = E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt[(p1 − c1)D1(p1)− γ
2
I11 ] dt+
∫ ∞
τ
e−rt[(p1 − c1)D1(p1, p2)− γ
2
I21 ] dt
]
.
The quality stock K1 has a depreciation rate of δ
k. The respective dynamics for the propri-
etary software firm are
Monopoly period (m1): A˙ = −D1(p1) + δAA, A(0) > 0
K˙1 = I1 − δKK1, K1(0) = 0, K1(τ) > 0
Duopoly period (m2): A˙ = −1 + s
2
(D1 +D2) + δ
AA, A(τ) > 0
K˙1 = I1 − δKK1, K1(τ) > 0
N˙ = D2(p1, p2)− δNN, N(τ) = 0
K˙2 = θN + I2 − δKK2, K2(τ) = 0.
9 The system switches from the monopoly mode to the duopoly mode due to the entry of the OS firm.
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The entrant uses open source software due to the absence of license fees to the proprietary
software firm and the development is faster thanks to user contributions. The OS software
complements the core product and the firm supports the development of the software. The
open source firm enters the market at time τ and competes in a duopoly (m2) with the pro-
prietary software firm. The OS firm selects prices and investment to maximize its discounted
profit as well.
max
p2,I2
Π2 =
∫ ∞
τ
e−rt[(p2 − c2)D2(p1, p2)− γ
2
I22 ] dt
A˙ = −1 + s
2
(D1 +D2) + δ
AA, A(τ) > 0
N˙ = D2(p1, p2)− δNN, N(τ) = 0
K˙2 = θN + I2 − δKK2, K2(τ) = 0
The quality of the open source product depends on user contributions and firm investment
since ”successful open source software development has become structured, and oftentimes
funded by interested commercial groups” (Haruvy et al. (2005), p. 198).
Assuming firms use stationary Markovian feedback strategies, a Markov Perfect Equilibrium
is calculated numerically.
4.2.4 Timing of the model and characterization of the Markov
Perfect Equilibria
To understand the steps of this piecewise deterministic differential game, the game can be
divided into two periods. In the monopoly period
max
p1,I1
Π1 =
∫ τ
0
e−rt[(p1 − c1)D1(p1)− γ
2
I21 ] dt+ e
−rτV1(•,m2)
A˙ = −D1(p1) + δAA, A(0) > 0
K˙1 = I1 − δK1, K1(0) = 0, K1(τ) > 0,
the proprietary software firm is a monopolist, but has to take into account an entrant at time
τ .
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The duopoly can be formulated as
max
p1,I1
Π1 =
∫ ∞
τ
e−rt[(p1 − c1)D1(p1, p2)− γ
2
I21 ] dt
max
p2,I2
Π2 =
∫ ∞
τ
e−rt[(p2 − c2)D2(p1, p2)− γ
2
I22 ] dt
A˙ = −(1 + s)
2
(D1(p1, p2) +D2(p1, p2)) + δ
AA, A(τ) > 0
N˙ = D2(p1, p2)− δNN, N(τ) = 0
K˙1 = I1 − δkK1, K1(τ) > 0
K˙2 = θN + I2 − δkK2, K2(τ) = 0.
To characterize the Markov perfect equilibria of the underlying game, a multi-mode game
(see Dockner et al. (2000), chap. 8) with a monopoly and duopoly mode is used. Due to the
linear quadratic structure of the game, the structure of the value functions are known and
the dynamic programming approach is reasonable. The value functions of the players depend
on the state variables and the mode as well. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations
are different in the monopoly and duopoly mode because of the absence of a competitor
(s = K2 = 0). The HJB equation for the proprietary software firm in the monopoly mode
(m1) is
rV1(A, 0, K1, 0,m1) = max
p1,I1
{
[(p1 − c1)D1(p1)− γ
2
I21 ] +
∂V1(•,m1)
∂A
(−D1(p1) + δAA)
+
∂V1(•,m1)
∂K1
(I1 − δkK1) + λ(V1(•,m2)− V1(•,m1))
}
. (4.2.8)
The expression in the first brackets indicates the instantaneous profit of selling proprietary
software. The next two terms express the effect of changes of the demand and quality. The
last term shows the value function effect of the entry by an open software competitor (i.e. the
potential jumps from mode m1 (monopoly) to mode m2 (duopoly)) where λ is the switching
rate. If the open source firm enters the market, both firms compete with differentiated
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products and their respective HJB equations are
rVi(A,N,K1, K2,m2) =max
pi,Ii
{
[(pi − ci)Di(pi, p∗j)−
γ
2
I2i ]
+
∂Vi(•,m2)
∂A
(−0.5(1 + s)(Di(pi, p∗j) +Dj(p∗j , pi)) + δAA)
+
∂Vi(•,m2)
∂Ki
(Ii − δkKi) + ∂Vi(•,m2)
∂N
(D2(pi, p
∗
j)− δNN)
+
∂Vi(•,m2)
∂Kj
(I∗j − δkKj)
}
, for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
(4.2.9)
To verify the feedback strategies for both modes, the multi-mode game is solved backward.
The open source firm has already entered the market in the duopoly mode and the feedback
strategies can be determined. The first order conditions from (4.2.9) provide the Markovian
investment and pricing strategies for both firms in mode 2:
p∗i (A,N,K1, K2,m2) =
1
4− s2
(
(2− s− s2)A+ 2ci + scj
+ d[(2− s2 + sβ)Ki − (s+ β − s2β)Kj]
+ (1− s2)∂Vi(•,m2)
∂A
+ 2s
∂Vi(•,m2)
∂N
+
s(1− s2)
2
∂Vj(•,m2)
∂A
− s∂Vj(•,m2)
∂N
)
I∗i (A,N,K1, K2,m2) =
1
γ
∂Vi(•,m2)
∂Ki
, i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
(4.2.10)
In the monopoly mode the game consists of two state variables (A1, K1) whereas in the
duopoly mode the firms have to take four states (A,N,K1, K2) into account. Due to the
anticipated entry, the maximization problem of the proprietary software firm still consists of
all four states in the monopoly mode but the feedback strategies just depend on two states
(A,K1). The first order conditions from (4.2.8) yield to the following feedback strategies in
mode 1:
p∗1(A,K1,m1) =
1
2
(
A+ c1 + dK1 +
∂V1(•,m1)
∂A
)
I∗1 (A,K1,m1) =
1
γ
∂V1(•,m1)
∂K1
.
(4.2.11)
Thanks to the linear quadratic structure of the game, the following value functions solve the
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HJB equations (4.2.8) and (4.2.9)
V1(A, 0, K1, 0,m1) =f
1
1A
2 + f 12K
2
1 + f
1
3AK1 + f
1
4A+ f
1
5K1 + f
1
6
Vi(A,N,K1, K2,m2) =f
2
1iA
2 + f 22iN
2 + f 23iK
2
1 + f
2
4iK
2
2
+ f 25iA N + f
2
6iA K1 + f
2
7iA K2 + f
2
8iNK1 + f
2
9iN K2 + f
2
10iK1K2
+ f 211iA+ f
2
12iN + f
2
13iK1 + f
2
14iK2 + f
2
15i for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
(4.2.12)
In order to calculate the coefficients of the respective value functions, solve the HJB equa-
tions for mode 2 and use V1(m2) to solve mode 1 afterwards. The Markovian strate-
gies p∗i (A,N,K1, K2,m2) and I
∗
i (A,N,K1, K2,m2) for mode 2 (duopoly mode) are used
for the HJB equation (4.2.9) and determine the f 2ni for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j and n = 1, .., 15
numerically. Subsequently, using the Markovian strategies for mode 1 (monopoly mode)
p∗1(A,N,K1, K2,m1), I
∗
1 (A,N,K1, K2,m1), the switching rate λ and V1(m2) solves HJB equa-
tion (4.2.8).
4.2.5 Stability
The Markovian price and investment strategies lead to a linear dynamical system
A˙
N˙
K˙1
K˙2
 =

h11 h12 h13 h14
h21 h22 h23 h24
h31 h32 h33 h34
h41 h42 h43 h44.

︸ ︷︷ ︸
H

A
N
K1
K2
+

R1
R2
R3
R4
 (4.2.13)
The system is globally asymptotically stable iff all the eigenvalues of the matrix H have
negative real parts. The numerical analysis is restricted to (globally)10 asymptotically stable
settings such that the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
e−rtVi(A(t), N(t), K1(t), K2(t), t) ≤ 0 i = 1, 2, (4.2.14)
is satisfied.
10 Due to the linear quadratic structure of the game.
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4.3 Economic Analysis-Numerical calculation
4.3.1 Mode 1: Anticipation effect
Market competition
To focus on pricing incentives and entry effects on pricing, quality is disregarded in a first
step and the model can be simplified to one control pi and one state A. In the absence of
quality effects, investment incentives are equal to zero and users are unable to contribute
to the quality.11 The resulting Markovian strategies p1(A,m1) for mode 1 and pi(A,m2)
for mode 2 just depend on the stock A. Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show the impact of
intensity of competition and switching rate on pricing strategies.12 Even though the entry
A
Figure 4.2: Competition effect for pricing
A
Figure 4.3: Entry effect for pricing
occurs earlier or later as expected, the price effect is obvious: The earlier the expected entry
and the higher the expected competition, the lower is the price of software incumbent. The
lower price results in faster shrinking market, which is shown by the reservation price A. It
is disadvantageous for an open source business model because less users are available, who
could contribute to the open source software quality.
11 If the quality does not affect the demand (d = 0), pricing is the only control and the market size A is
the only stock to take into account.
12 For the graphical illustration it is assumed that the actual entry time is given by the expected value
E(τ) = 1λ .
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Quality competition
If firms compete additionally with their quality according to (4.2.5), the anticipation of entry
also influences the investment incentives of the proprietary software firm in the monopoly.
Figure 4.4 shows that the expected entry time increases investment of the proprietary soft-
Figure 4.4: Entry effect λ Figure 4.5: Quality competition effect β
ware firm in the monopoly mode. The higher the probability of an entrant, the higher the
investment to improve its market position. The investment incentives for quality competition
depend crucially on β. If β < 0 and positive quality externalities exist, the proprietary soft-
ware firm has less incentives because the OS firm benefits immediately from the knowledge
stock K1 of the proprietary software firm accumulated in the monopoly mode. Whereas busi-
ness stealing β > 0 creates higher incentives in the monopoly mode because it improves the
market position of the proprietary software firm and lowers the amount of consumers who can
contribute to the OS software. The quality competition is presented in Figure 4.5. Lastly,
the network effect measures how many users contribute to the OS software. The impact on
pricing and investment incentives in the monopoly mode is demonstrated in Figure 4.6. The
network effect decreases prices and increases investment incentives. The higher the network
contribution in the duopoly mode, the lower the prices of the proprietary software firm in the
monopoly mode (see Figure 4.6 (a)). Lower prices lead to less consumers who can contribute
to the OS software in the duopoly such that the proprietary software firm keeps its quality
advantage. Contrary to pricing incentives, expected network contributions lead to higher
investments in the monopoly mode (see Figure 4.6 (b)). Higher investments bring higher
quality and higher prices, which hinders the OS firm to build up a network and to use the
contributions. As a result, the proprietary software firm uses both controls in the monopoly
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(a) Pricing (b) Investment
Figure 4.6: Network effect without quality competition (β = 0)
mode to complicate the diffusion of the OS software.
4.3.2 Mode 2: Impact of market structure on incentives
The previous section showed the influence of entry, network contributions and quality com-
petition on pricing and investment incentives in the monopoly. Subsequently, these effects
are analyzed for the duopoly mode, meaning after the entry of the OS firm.
Due to the four states the Markovian strategies are a mapping φi : R4+ → R with the following
structure
I∗i (A,N,K1, K2,m2) = bi1A+ bi2N + bi3K1 + bi4K2 + bi5
p∗i (A,N,K1, K2,m2) = bi6A+ bi7N + bi8K1 + bi9K2 + bi10,
(4.3.1)
where the parameters bij depend on the numerical solution of the HJB equation and, there-
fore, on the network effect θ and quality competition β. In order to examine both effects,
the analysis is restricted to the A-N -state space because both firms react differently to both
states. The investment incentives Ii and pricing incentives pi are always positively correlated
with Ki and negatively correlated with Kj with i, j = 1, 2 i 6= j as shown in Appendix C.1
and Appendix C.2.
Network
At first, how do network contributions affect investment incentives of the proprietary and the
OS software firm? Figure 4.7 displays the significance of the network effect for investment
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(a) Investment incentives (b) Pricing incentives
Figure 4.7: Incentive differences for β = 0
and pricing for both firms. Figure 4.7 (a) shows the investment difference of both firms with
respect to the A−N − space and neglected quality stocks (assuming K1 = K2 = 0).13 The
investment difference is negative. In other words, the open source software firm has higher
incentives than the proprietary software firm.14 The higher the network contributions θ, the
higher the difference. The open source firm has higher incentives because in addition to
higher quality and sales users contribute afterwards. Generally, the open source firm also
sets a lower price compared to the proprietary software firm (see Figure 4.7 (b)) to create
higher sales and add network contributions.15
From a consumer’s point of view it is more interesting if the competition between a pro-
prietary and open source software firm generates higher investment and, as a result, higher
quality products for the consumers. Are network contributions and investment substitutes or
complements? Figure 4.8 shows the overall investment consisting of firms’ investment if user
contribute minus investment without contribution (I1,θ + I2,θ − (I1,0 + I2,0)). All surfaces are
positive and, thus, network contributions bring out higher overall investment of the software
industry. The higher the network contributions θ, the higher the overall investment. There-
fore, the open source business model has a positive effect on overall investment. Consumers
benefit from lower prices and higher investment.
13 See Appendix C.1 for further details
14 Actually, the investment of the proprietary software is higher due to the higher quality K1 > K2 = 0
when the open source software firm enters the market.
15 The actual prices of both firms depend crucially on parameter setting, qualities Ki,Kj and the dynamics.
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Figure 4.8: Overall Investment: I1,θ + I2,θ
Quality competition
To demonstrate the effect of quality competition (business stealing or positive quality ex-
ternalities), the network effect is neglected (θ = 0). In addition and similar to the network
effect, assume similar to the previous section Ki = Kj = 0 (see Appendix C.2 for more
details). The impact of quality competition β after the entry is shown in Figure 4.9. The
Figure 4.9: Quality competition
investment for both firms Ii are increasing in β with respect to A.
16 This is in line with re-
sults for the monopoly mode where the investment I1(A,N,K1, K2,m1) was also increasing
in β. In the monopoly mode, positive quality externalities β < 0 lower incentives because
the open source software firm would benefit immediately from the accumulated quality K1
of the proprietary software firm when a market entry occurs. Business stealing β > 0 gives
16 The actual investments have to be adjusted due to the stocks Ki and Kj .
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the proprietary software firm a competitive advantage (K2(τ)− βK1(τ) < 0) when the open
source firm enters the market.
4.3.3 Value Functions
Finally, this section demonstrates the meaning of quality competition, entry time and network
contributions on the value function of the two firms. Given the initial stocks in the monopoly
mode A(0) = 20 and K1(0) = 0 as well as the initial stocks in the duopoly mode N(τ) = 0
and K2(τ) = 0, the expected value for each firm at t = 0 can be calculated. Figure 4.10
displays quality competition whereas Figure 4.11 shoes the effect of network competition.
The value function of the proprietary software V1(m1) firm is decreasing in λ whereas the
Figure 4.10: Quality competition
value function of the open source firm V2(m1) is increasing in λ: The proprietary software firm
wants to prevent an entry whereas the open source firm wants to enter as soon as possible.
Compared to the entry effect, the effect of quality competition and network contributions is
less substantial for the proprietary software firm because the main revenue is generated in
the monopoly period. Nevertheless, network contributions increase the revenue of the open
source firm and lower the revenue of the proprietary software firm. In contrast to the network
effect, quality competition decreases the revenues of both firm. In sum, network contributions
are always valuable for the open source firm, but due to a lot of positive quality externalities
the proprietary software firm can benefit as well.
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Figure 4.11: Network effect
4.4 Conclusion
Empirical data for the desktop and mobile platforms showed that a proprietary software had
a first mover advantage but an open source software competitor entered subsequently. The
proprietary software (Windows) dictates the desktop market whereas the mobile market is
dominated by the open source software (Android). The purpose of this model was to analyze
the influence of an open source threat on pricing and investment incentives if the proprietary
software firm has a first mover advantage. In mode 1, the proprietary software firm acts
monopolistically but is threatened by an open source competitor. The system switches to
the duopoly mode after the entry of the OS firm. The uncertainty of the entry and the
expected market structure influence the proprietary software firm and the results show the
strategic effects.
Anticipation effect: The earlier the entry of open source competitor, the lower the price
and the higher the investment of the proprietary software firm in the monopoly pe-
riod. The higher the expected intensity of competition, the lower the monopoly price,
the higher the initial profits and the steeper the slope of the profit function of the
proprietary software firm.
Network effect: The open source firm increases its investment and lowers prices with re-
spect to network contributions. In comparison to the open source firm, the propri-
etary software firm sets higher prices and invests less. In mode 2, user contributions
complement firm investments and overall innovation activity is higher thanks to user
contributions.
Chapter 4. Software Platform Competition 72
Quality competition: Business stealing increases investment incentives and positive qual-
ity externalities lower incentives in the monopoly and duopoly period.
In sum, the threat of an open source competitor brings out a stronger diffusion rate of the
proprietary software bundle with higher quality such that the development of the OS software
is as difficult as possible. Less consumers are able to contribute to the OS software and higher
quality gives a competitive advantage.
To resume the initial questions, the answers are as follows:
• The entry time and product differentiation determine essentially the success or failure
of an successful software market penetration.
• The software incumbent lowers prices to complicate market entry. If both firms compete
in software quality after the entry, the incumbent invests more initially. The incumbent
invests less if positive quality externalities exist.
• OS firms invest more than proprietary software firms and their investments complement
user contributions.
Given these insights and getting back to the initial example, the software dominance of
desktop and mobile platforms can be explained. Microsoft was able to build a high rate of
diffusion by bundling their Windows platform with computer sales. Consumers could not
buy hardware and software separately. Consumers got used to the system and additional
software was developed which improved the quality of Windows. Contrary, Linux was not
bundled and user contributions were less efficient17 compared to Android, because of the
complexity of an operating system source code. Thus, Linux diffusion rate was too low and
user contributions were insufficient to create a higher market share. In contrast to desktop
platforms, Android achieves a significant market share. Due to an early entry and substantial
user contribution18, Google was able to establish its software in the mobile and tablet market
despite of a delayed entry and a dominant competitor Apple with its high quality product.
17 User contributions can be additional applications or software source code. Both contributions improve
the quality, but source code contributions are less profitable and more complex.
18 Users have personal and monetary incentives to contribute to the source code or developing additional
applications.
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Android retailers (Samsung, HTC, LG etc.) were able to achieve a high diffusion rate with a
full range from low-end to high-end Android products whereas Apple just offered high-priced
products.
The model provided some beneficial results about market entry, quality competition and
network contributions. Nevertheless, some points are still open for discussion and future
research. First, both firms sell bundles of hardware and software for a price pi > 0. Generally,
open source software is for free and firms sell complementary products to realize profit (for
instance see Haruvy et al. (2005, 2008a, 2008b), Kort and Zaccour (2011), Caulkins et al.
(2013)). In order to focus on the diffusion process, the model is simplified to bundled products
with two controls and four states. However, the accumulated user network for proprietary and
open source software can serve as a complementary product where firms can sell additional
applications or sell mobile advertisement. Second, the supply chain management is managed
by one firm. A look at the mobile sector reveals that different vertical structures compete
with each other. Vertical integrated firms (Apple uses its own iOS) compete with independent
firms, which either use open source (Samsung, HTC etc. use Android) or develop their own
operating system (Nokia, Samsung etc. use Windows Phone). In contrast to the retailers, the
operating system firm makes profit by advertisement and additional applications. Therefore,
the supplier and retailer have conflicting diffusion incentives. The pricing incentives and
development efforts in different vertical structures should be compared in separated models.
Third, both firms sell one product and their cost structures (production costs and R&D
costs) are symmetric. The setup does not cover multi-product firms. For example, should
the OS firm establish a low quality product to create a network and develop a high quality
product afterwards? Finally, the model examines how an open source firm competes with
a proprietary software firm, but contrary, what entry barriers can be created by an open
source firm? Are other firms able to enter the market if development is accelerated by user
contributions? Are competitors excluded from using the open source platform? What are
economic policy implications from an open source dominance?
All these questions are topics for future research in separated settings.
Chapter 5
Final Conclusion
The interaction of structural changes and operational decisions were the objective of this
research project. How do theses market parameters influence profitability or consumer sur-
plus?
Chapter 2 showed that vertical integration is always profitable for the integrating firms and
Full Integration is the equilibrium of the Bimatrix Game. It can be profitable for competing
downstream firms if knowledge spillover are high and products are differentiated. Vertical
integration resolves the double marginalization and increases the investment incentive of
the integrating firm. If competing firms increase or decrease investments, depends on mar-
ket structure and knowledge spillover. Furthermore, the intertemporal strategic effect differs
between all three market structure (no integration, partial integration, full integration). Con-
sumers benefit from each vertical integration.
Chapter 3 shows that social responsibility depends on the relation of additional production
costs and sustainability. The threshold is related to market extension and business stealing
0 ≤ β
d
≤ 1. The higher this relation, the more are firms willing to invest in social products.
However, this business stealing creates a prisoner’s dilemma: Both firms invest in the less
profitable product. In addition, the higher business stealing, the more deviate consumer
preferences and equilibrium outcome.
Chapter 4 examines the impact of an market entry in the software industry. An open source
entrant competes with an proprietary software incumbent. Customer of the open source
product contribute to the quality afterwards. Due to the open source threat, the software in-
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cumbent lowers his prices to generate higher profits before the entry. He increases investment
if the product quality improves his market position. After the entry, the open source software
firm chooses lower prices and higher investment compared to the proprietary software firm.
Overall, the open source business model decreases prices and increases investment.
Structural changes and operational decisions affect each other, but their effects and the
preferences depend on the point of view. Vertical integration was beneficial for all partic-
ipating firms and consumers. Still, the preferences about socially responsible products can
differ highly between firms and consumers. Finally, the open source business model improves
investment and lowers prices, but is problematic for profits.
Appendix A
Appendix Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.3.1
Differentiating the right-hand side of (2.3.5) w.r.t. qi and equating to zero leads to the best
reply functions
qi =
A− ci +Ki + βKj
s+ 2
− 1
2
qj i, j = 1, 2 i 6= j
The best reply functions and differentiating (2.3.5) w.r.t. Ii yield to the equilibrium strate-
gies1
qci =
2(A− 2ci + cj + (2− β)Ki + (2β − 1)Kj)
3(s+ 2)
Ic1 =
B1K1 +B3Kj +B4
γ
Ic2 =
D2K2 +B3K2 +D5
γ
(A.1.1)
Substituting the outputs and investments we get the following HJB
rVi(Ki, Kj) =
[(
A− ((s+ 2)/2)(qci + qcj)− ci +Ki + βKj
)
qci −
1
2γ
(Ici )
2
+
∂Vi(·)
∂Ki
(Ici − δKi) +
∂Vi(·)
∂Kj
(
Icj − δKj
) ]
(A.1.2)
where qci is given by (A.1.1) and the partial derivatives by (2.2.9). Comparing coefficients of
the quadratic polynomial on the left and on the right hand side of the two HJB equations
1 Due to the linear quadratic structure, the optimal strategies are linear w.r.t. the state variables.
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gives the set of 12 equations and 12 unknowns:
r
2
B1 =
2(β − 2)2
9(2 + s)
+
B21
2γ
+
B3D3
γ
− δB1
r
2
B2 =
2(1− 2β)2
9(2 + s)
+
B23
2γ
+
B2D2
γ
− δB2
rB3 =
4(5β − 2β2 − 2)
9(2 + s)
+
B1B3 +B2D3 +B3D2
γ
− 2δB3
rB4 =
4(A− 2c1 + c2)(2− β)
9(2 + s)
+
B1B4 +B3D5 +B5D3
γ
− δB4
rB5 =
4(A− 2c1 + c2)(2β − 1)
9(2 + s)
+
B3B4 +B2D5 +B5D2
γ
− δB5
rB6 =
2(A− 2c1 + c2)2
9(2 + s)
+
B24
2γ
+
B5D5
γ
r
2
D1 =
2(1− 2β)2
9(2 + s)
+
D23
2γ
+
B1D1
γ
− δD1
r
2
D2 =
2(β − 2)2
9(2 + s)
+
D22
2γ
+
B3D3
γ
− δD2
rD3 =
4(5β − 2β2 − 2)
9(2 + s)
+
D2D3 +B1D3 +B3D1
γ
− 2δD3
rD4 =
4(A− 2c2 + c1)(2β − 1)
9(2 + s)
+
D3D5 +B1D4 +B4D1
γ
− δD4
rD5 =
4(A− 2c2 + c1)(2− β)
9(2 + s)
+
D2D5 +B3D4 +B4D3
γ
− δD5
rD6 =
2(A− 2c2 + c− 1)2
9(2 + s)
+
D25
2γ
+
B4D4
γ
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.3.2
Differentiating the right-hand side of (2.3.10) and (2.3.13) w.r.t. qi and Ii and equating to
zero leads to the equilibrium strategies
qc1 =
(4− s)A− 4c1 + sc2 + (4− sβ)K1 + (4β − s)K2
8− s2
qc2 =
(2− s)A− 2c2 + sc1 + (2β − s)K1 + (2− sβ)K2
8− s2
I1 =
B1K1 +B3K2 +B4
γ
I2 =
D2K2 +D3K1 +D5
γ
(A.2.1)
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Substituting the optimal outputs and investments the HJB for each player is
rV1(K1, K2) =
[(
A− qc1 − sqc2 − c1 +K1 + βK2
)
qc1 −
1
2γ
(Ic1)
2
+
∂V1(·)
∂K1
(Ic1 − δK1) +
∂V1(·)
∂K2
(Ic2 − δK2)
]
rV2(K1, K2) =
[(
A− sqc1 − 2qc2 − c2 +K2 + βK1
)
qc2 −
1
2γ
(Ic2)
2
+
∂V2(·)
∂K2
(Ic2 − δK2) +
∂V2(·)
∂K1
(Ic1 − δK1)
]
(A.2.2)
where qci and I
c
i are given by (A.2.1) and the partial derivatives by (2.2.9). Comparing
coefficients of the quadratic polynomial on the left and on the right hand side of the two
HJB equations for Partial Integration gives the set of 12 equations and 12 unknowns:
r
2
B1 =
(sβ − 4)2
(s2 − 8)2 +
B21
2γ
+
B3D3
γ
− δB1
r
2
B2 =
(s− 4β)2
(s2 − 8)2 +
B23
2γ
+
B2D2
γ
− δB2
rB3 =
2(4β − s)(4− βs)
(s2 − 8)2 +
B1B3 +B2D3 +B3D2
γ
− 2δB3
rB4 =
2(4− βs)((4− s)A− 4c1 + sc2)
(s2 − 8)2 +
B1B4 +B3D5 +B5D3
γ
− δB4
rB5 =
2(4β − s)((4− s)A− 4c1 + sc2)
(s2 − 8)2 +
B3B4 +B2D5 +B5D2
γ
− δB5
rB6 =
((4− s)A− 4c1 + sc2)2
(s2 − 8)2 +
B24
2γ
+
B5D5
γ
r
2
D1 =
2(2β − s)2
(s2 − 8)2 +
D23
2γ
+
B1D1
γ
− δD1
r
2
D2 =
2(2− βs)2
(s2 − 8)2 +
D22
2γ
+
B3D3
γ
− δD2
rD3 =
4(2β − s)(2− βs)
(s2 − 8)2 +
D2D3 +B1D3 +B3D1
γ
− 2δD3
rD4 =
4(2β − s)((2− s)A− 2c2 + sc1)
(s2 − 8)2 +
D3D5 +B1D4 +B4D1
γ
− δD4
rD5 =
4(2− βs)((2− s)A− 2c2 + sc1)
(s2 − 8)2 +
D2D5 +B3D4 +B4D3
γ
− δD5
rD6 =
2((2− s)A− 2c2 + sc1)2
(s2 − 8)2 +
D25
2γ
+
B4D4
γ
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3.3
Differentiating the right-hand side of (2.3.16) w.r.t. qi and Ii and equating to zero leads to
the equilibrium strategies
qci =
(2− s)A− 2ci + scj + (2− βs)Ki + (2β − s)Kj
4− s2 i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j
IC1 =
1
γ
B1K1 +B3Kj +B4
IC2 =
1
γ
D2K2 +B3K2 +D5
(A.3.1)
Substituting the outputs and investments we get the following HJB
rVi(Ki, Kj) =
[(
A− qi − sqj − ci +Ki + βKj
)
qci −
1
2γ
(Ici )
2
+
∂Vi(·)
∂Ki
(Ici − δKi) +
∂Vi(·)
∂Kj
(
Icj − δKj
) ]
(A.3.2)
where qci is given by (A.3.1) and the partial derivatives by (2.2.9). Comparing coefficients of
the quadratic polynomial on the left and on the right hand side of the two HJB equations
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for Full Integration gives the set of 12 equations and 12 unknowns:
r
2
B1 =
(2− βs)2
(4− s2)2 +
B21
2γ
+
B3D3
γ
− δB1
r
2
B2 =
(2β − s)2
(4− s2)2 +
B23
2γ
+
B2D2
γ
− δB2
rB3 =
2(2β − s)(2− βs)
(4− s2)2 +
B1B3 +B2D3 +B3D2
γ
− 2δB3
rB4 =
2(2− βs)((2− s)A− 2c1 + sc2)
(4− s2)2 +
B1B4 +B3D5 +B5D3
γ
− δB4
rB5 =
2(2β − s)((2− s)A− 2c1 + sc2)
(4− s2)2 +
B3B4 +B2D5 +B5D2
γ
− δB5
rB6 =
((2− s)A− 2c1 + sc2)2
(4− s2)2 +
B24
2γ
+
B5D5
γ
r
2
D1 =
(2β − s)2
(4− s2)2 +
D23
2γ
+
B1D1
γ
− δD1
r
2
D2 =
(2− βs)2
(4− s2)2 +
D22
2γ
+
B3D3
γ
− δD2
rD3 =
2(2β − s)(2− βs)
(4− s2)2 +
D2D3 +B1D3 +B3D1
γ
− 2δD3
rD4 =
2(2β − s)((2− s)A− 2c2 + sc1)
(4− s2)2 +
D3D5 +B1D4 +B4D1
γ
− δD4
rD5 =
2(2− βs)((2− s)A− 2c2 + sc1)
(4− s2)2 +
D2D5 +B3D4 +B4D3
γ
− δD5
rD6 =
((2− s)A− 2c2 + sc1)2
(4− s2)2 +
D25
2γ
+
B4D4
γ
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Appendix Chapter 3
B.1 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB)
For all maximization problems we calculate stationary Markov perfect equilibria and use the
HJB equation to find the equilibrium price and investment strategies. To apply the HJB
approach, it is necessary to find a bounded and continuously differentiable value function
Vi(Gi, Gj) with i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j which satisfies the HJB equations (B.2.1), (B.2.3) and
(B.2.5). For all three scenarios we have a linear quadratic game (see Dockner et al. (2000)
chapter 7.1 for further details) and, therefore, a quadratic value function
Vi =
1
2
k1iG
2
i +
1
2
k2iG
2
j + k3iGiGj + k4iGi + k5iGj + k6i i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j, (B.1.1)
solves the HJB equation. The unknown parameters kil with l = 1, .., 6 and i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j
have to be determined for each scenario. Comparing the coefficients of the left-hand side
and the right-hand side of the HJB equation leads to a non-linear equation system which is
solved numerically.
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B.2 Feedback strategies
B.2.1 Two profit maximizing firms
If both firms decide not to use social responsible investment, their respective Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equations for their optimization problems are
rVi(G
PM
i , G
PM
j ) = max
pi,Ai
{
[(pi − ci)qi − γ
2
A2i ]
+
∂Vi(·)
∂GPMi
(Ai − δPMi GPMi ) +
∂Vi(·)
∂GPMj
(Aj − δPMj GPMj )
}
, i = 1, 2; i 6= j (B.2.1)
where qi are the demand functions following from equation (3.2.2). The coefficients kil with
l = 1, .., 6 are calculated numerically. Differentiating the right hand side w.r.t. pi and Ai and
equating to zero leads to symmetric Markov perfect strategies
Ai =
1
γ
∂Vi(·)
∂GPMi
pi = 0.5((1− s)α + d(GPMi − sGPMj ) + β(sGPMi −GPMj ) + ci + spj), i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j.
(B.2.2)
The strategies are linear in the state thanks to the linear-quadratic structure. Substituting
the prices pi and investments Ai in equation (B.2.1) results in an equation where just the
coefficients kil are unknown. Comparing the coefficients of the left-hand side and the right-
hand side of the HJB equation leads to a nonlinear equation system with twelve unknown
coefficients (kil with l = 1, .., 6 and i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j) and twelve equations which is solved
numerically.
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B.2.2 A socially concerned firm challenging a non-social competi-
tor
The setting is different if both firms choose different investment strategies
rVi(G
SR
i , G
PM
j ) = max
pi,CSRi
{
[(pi − (ci + w CSRi)))qi − γ
2
CSR2i ]
+
∂Vi(·)
∂Gi
(CSRi − δSRi GSRi ) +
∂Vi(·)
∂Gj
(Aj − δPMj GPMj )
}
rVj(G
SR
i , G
PM
j ) = max
pj ,Aj
{
[(pj − cj)qj − γ
2
A2j ]
+
∂Vj(·)
∂GPMj
(Aj − δPMj GPMj ) +
∂Vj(·)
∂GSRi
(CSRi − δSRi GSRj )
}
, i 6= j.
(B.2.3)
Differentiating the right-hand side w.r.t. pi, Ai respectively CSRi and equating to zero, the
resulting best-reply functions are
CSRi =
1
γ
(
∂Vi
∂GSRi
+
s(α + dGPMj − βGSRi − pj)− (α + dGSRi − βGPMj − pi)w
1− s2
)
pi = 0.5((1− s)α + d(GSRi − sGPMj ) + β(sGSRi −GPMj ) + spj + ci + wCSR)
Aj =
1
γ
∂Vj
∂GPMj
pj = 0.5((1− s)α + d(GPMj − sGSRi ) + β(sGPMj −GSRi ) + spi + cj), i = 1, 2; i 6= j.
(B.2.4)
where GSRi is the stock of a socially responsible firm and G
PM
j of a non-social firm. Solving
for the Markovian strategies and substituting in (B.2.3) leads to the HJB equation with the
unknown coefficients kil. Similar to the previous case, we calculate the kil numerically.
Due to the interaction of price and investment if firms choose socially responsible strategies
we restrict the displaying to the best reply functions instead of the equilibrium solution
for the asymmetric case and the following symmetric social case as well. Nevertheless, the
strategies are linear in the state because of the linear-quadratic structure of the game.
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B.2.3 Two socially concerned firms
If both firms want a social image, their respective HJB equations are
rVi(G
SR
i , G
SR
j ) = max
pi,CSRi
{
[(pi − (ci + w CSRi))qi − γ
2
CSR2i ]
+
∂Vi(·)
∂GSRi
(CSRi − δSRi GSRi ) +
∂Vi(·)
∂GSRj
(CSRj − δSRj GSRj )
}
, i = 1, 2; i 6= j (B.2.5)
The best reply functions (B.2.6) follow the first order conditions.
CSRi =
1
γ
(
∂Vi
∂GSRi
+
s(α + dGSRj − βGSRi − pj)− (α + dGSRi − βGSRj − pi)w
1− s2
)
pi = 0.5((1− s)α + d(GSRi − sGSRj ) + β(sGSRi −GSRj ) + spj + ci + wCSRi,
i = 1, 2; i 6= j.
(B.2.6)
The coefficients kil of the value function (B.1.1) have to be determined numerically by the
equation system which follows from comparing the right-hand side and the left-hand side of
the HJB equation.
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B.3 Graphical illustration of profits and consumer sur-
plus
The discounted profits over the time horizon t to ∞ are displayed below.
(a) β = 0.1 (b) β = 0.5 (c) β = 0.9
Figure B.1: Two PMFs (green), asymmetric case with a SRF (blue) and
a PMF (red), two SRFs (orange)
Figure B.2 shows the overall consumer surplus for each scenario with different degrees of
business stealing.
(a) β = 0.1 (b) β = 0.5 (c) β = 0.9
Figure B.2: CS for two non-social firms (yellow), asymmetric firms
(cyan), two socially concerned firms (purple)
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C.1 Network effect with respect to quality stocks
Because of graphical illustration, the analysis in section 4.3.2 was restricted to the A−N -state
space. Nevertheless, the Markovian strategies are a 4-dimensional mapping φi(A,N,Ki, Kj)
(see equation (4.3.1)) and this section shows how the parameters with respect to the knowl-
edge stocks Ki and Kj adjust if network contributions θ or quality competition β are modified.
Figure C.1 displays how the parameter bi3 and bi4 in equation (4.3.1) adjust with respect
Figure C.1: Investment incentives with respect to quality stocks
to the quality stocks. Investment incentives are positive with respect to the own stock and
negative with respect to the stock of the competitor. Network contributions affect slightly
positively the investment with respect to its own stock and negatively with respect to the
competitive stock.
Network contributions have almost no effect on the parameters bi8 and bi8 of the pricing
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strategies (see equation (4.3.1)), shown in Figure C.2.
Figure C.2: Pricing incentives with respect to quality stocks
Overall, the network contributions do highly affect the parameters of the quality stocks.
The network contributions effect is more obvious in the A−N−space which is presented in
section 4.3.2.
C.2 Quality competition with respect to quality stocks
Figure C.3: Investment incentives w.r.t. quality stocks
( ∂I
∂N
= 0 because of θ = 0)
Similar to the previous section and the network affect, this sections shows how the parameters
of the Markovian strategies adjust if quality competition intensifies. A positive externality
(β < 0) lowers my investment incentives whereas quality competition (β > 0) enhances its
investment incentives with respect to its own stock Ki and vice versa with respect to the
competitive stock Kj (see Figure C.3). The pricing incentives adjust to variations of quality
competition similar to investment incentives (see Figure C.4).
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Figure C.4: Pricing incentives w.r.t. quality stocks
Similar to section 4.3.2, intensified quality competition leads to higher investments and lower
prices.
C.3 Trajectories for a specific setup
Figure C.5: Trajectories for θ = 0.09 and β = 0
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